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THE INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR 




This paper investigates the inter-industry wage structure in the 
1984 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel and compares the main 
findings with those available for the U.S. and Sweden. In 
contrast with what emerges from aggregate data, empirical 
evidence based on individual data emphasizes cross-country 
differences. Although industry differentials appear significant, 
labour quality and other compensating factors have a major impact 
in explaining the wage structure, thus suggesting the possibility 
that industry differences just reflect the effect of unobservable 
characteristics. The degree of centralization of wage bargaining 
may play a role in accounting for the observed pattern of 
industry wages.
I would like to thank John Micklewright and Robert Waldmann for 
their many helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful 
to the participants in the Students' Workshop at the E.U.I. and 
in the VI Convegno Nazionale di Economia del Lavoro at the 
University of Bergamo, where a previous version of this paper was 
presented and discussed. The German Socioeconomic Panel data set 
was made available under the responsibility of Hans Peter 
























































































































































































"A few years ago we hired a new secretary in my department. 
She was smart and efficient and we were pleased to have her. Much 
to our dismay, after just a few months she was offered and 
accepted a job from an IBM facility in a nearby city. She told 
me that she had been on a waiting list there for a year or so, 
and would be a fool to turn IBM down since they paid so much more 
than any of the other local employers. I wondered at the time 
whether her marginal product typing IBM interoffice memos could 
be that much higher than it would be typing manuscripts and 
referee reports, and/or why IBM should find it profitable to pay 
much more than the going wage. (...). These observations seem to 
violate the law of one price, a fundamental component of the 
theory of competitive markets." (Thaler, 1989, pp.181-182).
1. Introduction
Several empirical studies of the inter-industry wage 
structure show results which do not seem consistent with the 
competitive model of the labour market. On the one hand, at a 
micro data level of analysis, they suggest that there exist 
unexplained wage differentials which depend on industry 
affiliation. Even after controlling for varying human capital 
factors and working conditions, industry wage differences appear 
to remain substantial (Krueger and Summers, 1987 and 1988; 
Dickens and Katz, 1987a and 1987b; Katz and Summers, 1989). On 
the other hand, using aggregate industry wage data, some authors 
claim that the structure of inter-industry wage differences 
appears to be stable over time and across different countries, 
a result that may call for the introduction of non-competitive 
considerations to be rationalized (Krueger and Summers, 1987; 
Katz and Summers, 1989).
The existing empirical literature on the determinants of 
industry wage differentials using individual data essentially 
concerns the U.S. labour market. Some evidence is also available 
for the Swedish labour market (Edin and Zetterberg, 1989). In 
this paper I present evidence for Germany, based on the 




























































































The approach here adopted consists in the estimation of a wage 
equation which includes measures of human capital and working 
conditions, as well as industry affiliation controls, as 
explanatory variables. This method permits a better evaluation 
of competitive and non-competitive influences on the process of 
wage determination and the resulting inter-industry structure of 
relative wages. As we will see, industry differentials appear to 
a certain extent significant. However, differently from what 
emerges for the U.S. case, labour quality and other competitive 
factors have a major impact in explaining the wage structure, 
thus suggesting the possibility that industry differences just 
reflect the effect of unobservable characteristics.
Empirical analyses of the stability of wage structures 
across countries have been based so far on aggregate industry 
wage data. Here I consider cross-country comparisons of the 
inter-industry wage structure as emerging from micro data, rather 
than from average industry data. I will contrast my results with 
those presented in two similar studies, the first on the U.S. by 
Krueger and Summers (1988) and the second on Sweden by Edin and 
Zetterberg (1989). All the papers make use of individual level 
data in a similar cross-sectional approach for 1984. My interest 
in comparing the wage dispersion across industries in these three 
countries derives from the fact that they are usually considered 
as characterized by different labour market institutional 
structures and in particular, by a different degree of 
centralization of wage bargaining. In contrast with what emerges 
from aggregate data, empirical evidence based on individual data 
emphasizes cross-country differences and the degree of 
centralization of wage bargaining may play a role in accounting 
for the observed pattern of industry wages.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 
2 I illustrate theories of the labour market which provide 
explanations for the existence of inter-industry wage 
differentials. In section 3 I present several criteria for 
evaluating the degree of centralization of wage setting and 
compare the different institutional conditions for wage 




























































































the range of the degree of centralization in OECD labour markets. 
In section 4 I show and discuss the limits of empirical evidence 
for the inter-industry wage structure based on aggregate industry 
wage data as presented in the recent literature. In section 5 I 
describe the main results of the empirical analysis of the German 
case obtained with the data from the Socioeconomic Panel. In 
section 6 I compare my empirical evidence with that available for 
the U.S. and Sweden. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Theories__fif__the__Labour_Market__and__Inter-industry Wage
Differentials
Competitive theories of the labour market suggest that job 
characteristics which have no direct influence on the utility of 
workers should not affect the level of wages. Workers are paid 
a wage equal to their opportunity cost, which depends on 
accumulated human capital and their working conditions. In other 
words, equally skilled workers should be compensated in a way 
that guarantees equal levels of utility. In this context, 
inter-industry wage differentials might simply reflect labour 
quality differences which vary systematically across industries 
and/or compensating differentials for some aspects of the working 
conditions in the various industries of employment.
Non-competitive theories, instead, predict that job 
attributes having no effect on workers' utility should 
systematically affect the wage structure, as far as they have an 
influence on the optimal solution to the firms' maximization 
problem. Equally skilled workers are paid differently according 
to features like industry affiliation. Possible explanations for 
persistent inter-industry wage differentials for equally 
productive workers in the class of non-competitive theories are 
offered by efficiency wage models (Krueger and Summers, 1988) and 
the insider-outsider model (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) .
The efficiency wage model in all its variants - shirking, 
labour turnover, adverse selection, gift exchange models 
(surveyed by Stiglitz, 1986 and Katz, 1986) - provides a 




























































































workers' utility can indeed affect the structure of relative 
wages. The key issue is firms' imperfect information: if firms 
differ in their ability to face turnover costs, to measure the 
productivity of workers, or to monitor them, either because of 
differences in management capacity, or because of differences in 
the technology of production, then this may be reflected in 
substantial wage differentials for similar workers. The optimal 
wage will be different among firms and, in particular, some firms 
will find it profitable to pay non-competitive wages above the 
going rate, thus inducing involuntary unemployment. And if some 
forms of imperfect information - like those giving rise to 
turnover costs or monitoring costs - depend on industry specific 
characteristics, such as the technology of production, then 
firm-level differentials will be reflected, at an aggregate 
level, in significant inter-industry wage differentials, 
consistently with the efficiency wage hypothesis (Krueger and 
Summers, 1988).
Another possible explanation of the inter-industry wage 
structure is the one arising from the insider-outsider theory. 
According to the insider-outsider model, wages are the outcome 
of a bargaining process whereby firms and their 'insiders' share 
the economic rent from insider employment. In this context, the 
insiders' wages will be higher, the more their firms stand to 
lose from a breakdown in wage negotiations. The degree of 
vulnerability to the exercise of the insider power is in turn a 
function of industry specific conditions, like profit 
opportunities, the technology of production, the concentration 
ratio and workers market power in their industries. 
Inter-industry wage differentials may therefore reflect 
differences in these sectoral conditions (Lindbeck and Snower, 
1988) .
Recent literature has also suggested a more general 
explanation for the observed pattern of inter-industry wage 
differentials, based on the relationship between the degree of 
wage dispersion across industries and the type of labour market 
institutions (Bell and Freeman, 1986; Freeman, 1988). Labour 




























































































determinant of the labour market performance of the advanced 
economies in terms of employment and unemployment rates and, more 
generally, of the macroeconomic performance of a country (Bruno 
and Sachs, 1985, ch.ll; Newell and Symons, 1987; Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988; Layard et al., 1991). Among the 
aspects characterizing the structure of labour markets, the focus 
is on the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. Countries 
with very high or very low wage dispersion are supposed to be the 
countries with highly decentralized or highly centralized wage 
setting procedures respectively, while intermediate degrees of 
centralization tend to be associated with an intermediate wage 
dispersion across industries (Freeman, 1988) .
The explanation of industry wage differentials in terms of 
degree of centralization in wage setting procedures - and in 
general of labour market institutions - may be seen as a more 
general approach when compared with the efficiency wage and 
insider-outsider models. I believe that it is not in contrast 
with these two theories and that, in a sense, it encompasses both 
of them. Efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories are not 
independent of the institutional framework and can be considered 
as alternative microfoundations for wage determination, which 
become relevant under different labour market institutions. 
According to the efficiency wage models, firms are assumed to 
make both wage and employment decisions unilaterally. This 
assumption seems more realistic in a labour market characterized 
by a high degree of decentralization of wage bargaining, where 
workers have a limited market power in wage negotiations. In the 
insider-outsider model, the market power of the insiders in the 
bargaining process is certainly increased by some degree of 
unionization, but at the same time unions are assumed not to take 
into account the interest of the outsiders. These conditions seem 
consistent with an intermediate degree of centralization of wage 
setting, where unions can exert some market power but are led to 
ignore the unemployment consequences of their actions. If we test 
the nature of the relationship between the degree of 
centralization of wage bargaining and the degree of wage 




























































































relevance of efficiency wage and insider-outsider models in 
explaining the observed pattern of industry wage differentials 
and we ultimately evaluate their importance in accounting for 
involuntary unemployment.
Despite the general agreement about the significant role 
played by labour market institutions from a theoretical point of 
view, existing empirical analyses of the nature of the 
relationship between cross-country differences in the degree of 
centralization and of wage dispersion and the differing labour 
market performance across countries have offered conflicting 
interpretations. Some studies (Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986; 
Newell and Symons, 1987; Layard et al., 1991) relate good 
outcomes with respect to employment and unemployment to 
centralized labour markets with low wage dispersion, where large 
and all-encompassing trade unions take into account the 
unemployment effects of wage determination. Others (OECD, 1985 
and 1987) associate labour market success with decentralization 
of wage setting and greater cross-industry wage dispersion, since 
a higher flexibility of relative wages allows greater scope for 
industry-specific factors. Finally, some authors (Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988) postulate the existence of a 
non-monotonic relationship between centralization/dispersion and 
the labour market performance, with countries having highly 
centralized institutions and low wage dispersion and countries 
with highly decentralized bargaining and high wage dispersion 
both showing better employment outcomes than countries with 
intermediate types of wage structure and labour market 
institutions.
These divergences in the conclusions about the relation 
between wage dispersion, institutions and economic performance 
suggest the danger of generalizing from results based on 
aggregate data, as it is the case in the studies previously 
mentioned. On the one hand, countries exhibiting a similar degree 
of wage dispersion at an aggregate level are characterized by 
very different institutional frameworks and wage bargaining 
procedures. For example, the U.S. and Austria, which are 




























































































centralization respectively, are both classified by Freeman 
(1988) as having a high and increasing degree of wage dispersion 
within OECD countries over the period 1970-86; similarly for 
Switzerland and Germany, as less extreme examples. On the other 
hand, countries forming natural pairs in institutional terms - 
such as Sweden and Norway, the U.K. and Ireland - present, again 
according to Freeman (1988), rather different degrees of 
dispersion in the inter-industry wage structure. The same sort 
of ambiguity can be detected within some of the above mentioned 
studies with respect to the relationship between indicators of 
the labour market structure and labour market performance, since 
countries with similar institutions may perform very differently
- for example, the U.S. and Japan, Sweden and Denmark (Calmfors 
and Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988).
If cross-industry wage dispersion is used as the most 
important indicator of the underlying labour market institutions 
to be related to employment performances, average industry wages 
at an aggregate level are not a proper magnitude for evaluating 
the inter-industry structure of relative compensations. In fact, 
they may reflect many factors other than institutional 
characteristics which present wide variations across industries
- like differences in technology and productivity - and which are 
perfectly consistent with the competitive theories of the labour 
market.
For a better evaluation of the relationship between the 
degree of centralization and industry wage dispersion, at least 
two problems deserve some attention. Firstly, we need an accurate 
definition of centralization, in order to classify the various 
countries unambiguously. The following section 3 discusses this 
subject. Secondly, inter-industry wage differentials of a 
non-competitive nature need to be properly measured. This major 
point is treated extensively in section 4, where existing 
evidence based on aggregate industry wage data is presented and 
critically assessed, and in sections 5 and 6, where empirical 
results based on micro data are illustrated and opposed to those 




























































































3. Institutional Conditions for Wage Bargaining in the U.S.. 
Germany, and Sweden
Following Tarantelli (1986), I define the degree of 
centralization in wage bargaining as one of the main dimensions 
of a labour market characteristic termed "corporatism" by 
political scientists, the others being the degree of cooperation 
between trade unions and employers' representatives in wage 
bargaining and the system of regulation of industrial conflicts. 
According to Bruno and Sachs (1985), corporatism is in turn one 
of the two important dimensions of labour market flexibility, 
together with nominal wage responsiveness to changing labour 
market conditions. It is therefore clear that the degree of 
centralization represents only one of the aspects of the broader 
concept of labour market flexibility, but hopefully one which is 
more easily measurable.
In their attempt to classify different countries according 
to the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, various 
authors have considered several definitions of centralization, 
each of them putting emphasis on different factors characterizing 
the process of wage setting. Bruno and Sachs (1985) focus on the 
level at which wage negotiations proceed and on the extent of 
coordination within trade unions and employer associations. 
According to them, the key feature is voting on collectively 
bargained agreements. A similar but more limited aspect is 
emphasized in the definition provided by Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) . They define it as the extent of inter-union and 
inter-employer cooperation in wage bargaining. The focus is 
therefore on the extent to which coalitions are formed among 
unions and employers respectively, that is on the behavioural 
content of wage setting rather than on the formal one, as it is 
the case when we consider the level at which bargaining occurs. 
Other authors - reported and discussed by Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) - define centralization according to similar criteria. 
Schmitter (1981) considers only the union side. Cameron (1984) 
takes into account only the union side, but in addition he 




























































































cooperation among workers in general rather than among unions 
only. Blyth (1979) relies on two criteria: the extent to which 
coalitions are formed within unions and within employers in 
actual wage bargaining and the level at which bargaining takes 
place. A much more comprehensive definition of centralization is 
proposed by Tarantelli (1986). According to him, a centralized 
system of industrial relations is characterized by bargaining 
mainly taking place at the national and/or industrial or regional 
level, rather than at the company and plant level, by a high 
degree of coordination within the organizational structure of 
trade unions, by a few key contracts influencing directly or 
indirectly a high percentage of the labour force, and by 
bargaining taking place at close - for example, one year - and 
non-overlapping or synchronous intervals. This last condition is 
particularly interesting, since it attempts to measure the 
possibility of fine-tuning wage agreements preserving the 
structure of relative compensations in the presence of changing 
economic conditions. Finally, Freeman (1988) suggests the use of 
union density as a very simple indicator of the degree of 
centralization. The main problem with this approach is to judge 
the extent to which differing unionization rates actually reflect 
differences in the formal or informal coverage of union contracts 
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) . Moreover, differences in national 
definition and measurement are likely to affect the comparability 
across countries. Freeman himself concludes from his empirical 
analysis that after controlling for other indicators of 
centralization, union density does not play a significant 
additional role (Freeman, 1988) .
In the light of the various definitions of centralization 
that I have provided, I can now turn to examine the principal 
institutional conditions for wage setting in the three countries 
considered in the present study - the U.S., Germany, and Sweden 
- in order to try to classify their degree of centralization of 
wage bargaining. I will especially consider the situation as it 
appeared in the first half of the 1980s, which is the relevant 





























































































The U.S. labour market is usually qualified as one of the 
most decentralized among Western economies. Union density in 
1984/5 was only 18 percent of non-agricultural wage and salaried 
employees and fell sharply during both 1970-79 (-6%) and 1979-85 
(-7%) (Freeman, 1988). Wage negotiations occur predominantly at 
the enterprise and plant level. There is no traditional 
involvement by central organizations in bargaining: the main U.S. 
labour confederation, the AFL-CIO, does not bargain for its 
affiliated unions and therefore has never signed a wage contract; 
no national employer federation is engaged in the collective 
bargaining process. As a general practice, a large proportion of 
collectively bargained agreements must be ratified by individual 
union members. The U.S. system exhibits a largely unstable and 
complex network of pattern bargaining, with 195,000 collective 
agreements affecting about 25% of the labour force (at the end 
of the 1970s) . Synchronization of contract renewals is very low 
and contracts have a long duration - often three years (Bruno and 
Sachs, 1985; Tarantelli, 1986; Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) .
3.2 Germany
Germany presented in 1984/5 a moderate degree of union 
density, 42 percent of industrial employees, which exhibited an 
increase in the period 1970-79 (+5%) and remained constant in the 
period 1979-85 (Freeman, 1988). Collective wage agreements are 
normally struck within industries on a regional basis, but 
regional negotiations are closely coordinated by national trade 
unions and employer associations. Wage bargaining in the metal 
industry provides the guide-lines for negotiations in all the 
other industrial and service sectors. Trade unions and employer 
associations have comparatively centralized and encompassing 
organizational structures. There exists one central union 
confederation, the DGB, and single unions are organized on a 
branch basis - 17 branch trade unions associated with the DGB. 




























































































most important of which - on a national basis - is the BDA. 
Central associations, however, are not usually involved in actual 
collective bargaining. Contracts signed in the metal sector by 
the metal industry union, the IGM, represent a benchmark for all 
the other contracts, thus influencing as a matter of fact a high 
percentage of the labour force. The duration of contracts is 
typically one year and negotiations take place throughout the 
year, though again the metal sector is considered to be the key 
industry for setting the contract renewals pattern, which 
guarantees a fair degree of synchronization (Flanagan et al., 
1983; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
A distinctive feature of German collective bargaining is 
that the relationship between the trade unions and the employer 
associations is characterized by a relatively high level of 
cooperation and willingness to compromise. During the 1980s, 
trade unions accepted wage agreements which led - for the first 
time in the post-war era - to a considerable reduction of net 
real wages. In the spring of 1984, after the biggest strike in 
the history of West Germany, employers agreed to a reduction of 
the working week from forty to thirty-eight and a half hours and 
unions - with IGM as the pacemaker - consented in return to an 
increase in the degree of flexibility of working time. These 
agreements also reflect a general tendency toward the 
decentralization of industrial relations, implying a shift of 
competence in collective bargaining from an industry to a company 
level and a delegation of decision power to the management and 
work councils under the system of "co-determination", which is 
the peculiar institution of German industrial relations (Streeck, 
1987; Jacobi and Mueller-Jentsch, 1990).
3.3 Sweden
The Swedish system is built around nearly universal union 
participation and this puts Sweden among the countries with the 
largest extent of union coverage. In 1984/5, 95 percent of 
blue-collar workers were represented in the national trade union 




























































































white-collar workers were represented in two other union 
organizations, TCO and SACO-SR. The overall union density 
experienced a sharp rise both during 1970-79 (+10%) and during 
1979-85 (+6%) (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Freeman, 1988). The level 
of negotiation is highly centralized: detailed wage bargaining 
typically takes place at the industry level and then is further 
refined at the local level, but national level agreements serve 
as an essential guide-post for negotiations at the industry and 
firm level. The union confederation LO is organized along branch 
lines - 24 branch federations associated with the central 
organization. Employers are almost universally represented in the 
national employer confederation, the SAF. Central collective 
agreements are negotiated, without exception, between LO and SAF. 
Negotiators at the branch level have the power to reach 
agreements which are binding for all the members of the branch 
and individual union members voting on these agreements is 
virtually nonexistent. As a result, national and a few 
branch-level agreements affect almost the entire economy's wage 
setting. Synchronization of contract renewals is high and 
contracts duration is normally one-two years (Bruno and Sachs, 
1985; Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
Between the 1950s and the mid-1970s, a wide national 
consensus was reached in Sweden concerning the so-called 
"Scandinavian model". Its norm was that labour should maintain 
a constant share of national income and the scope for overall 
real wage increases was measured on this rule. Despite the 
changes in general economic conditions since then, there 
remained, in the 1980s, a basic commitment to a constant-share 
strategy of wage setting (Bruno and Sachs, 1985).
Wage bargaining in Sweden has also been crucially influenced 
by the "solidaristic wage policy". Initially conceived in 1936 
and fully elaborated by LO in the 1950s with both growth and 
equity objectives, it developed along with government labour 
market programmes about training and labour mobility. The basic 
principle was "equal pay for equal workers": workers performing 
the same job should receive the same wage, irrespective of 




























































































principle has been implemented by raising the relative wages of 
workers in low-productivity sectors and by not fully exercising 
bargaining power in sectors with the greatest ability to pay. 
Lacking exact criteria for comparing jobs in different 
industries, the solidaristic policy has given way, since the 
1960s, to a strictly egalitarian narrowing of wage differences 
between workers in different occupations (Flanagan, 1987) .
The Swedish case seems, in several respects, to be 
representative of a highly centralized economy. There are however 
some caveats against the traditional classification of Sweden as 
one of the most centralized countries within OECD (Calmfors and 
Nymoen, 1990) . Contrary to the frequently held view, centralized 
bargaining never concerns the whole economy. There is no 
coordination between the private and public sector unions within 
central organizations and both private and public employers 
bargain with different associations for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. More relevantly, bargaining never occurs 
at the central level only. Because of the "wage drift" - wage 
increases at the local level in excess of the central agreements 
- which has become more important with real wage moderation after 
1983, it is not clear to what extent the final outcome is 
controlled by central wage bargaining. Between 1971 and 1984, the 
wage drift accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the hourly earnings 
increases of blue-collar workers (40% in 1984) and for 20 to more 
than 50 percent of the hourly earnings increases of white-collar 
workers in private industry (61% in 1984) (Flanagan, 1987) . Some 
authors (Bruno and Sachs, 1985) support the hypothesis that 
central bargaining may be able to offset variations in wage 
drift, but this view is challenged by others (Flanagan, 1987), 
and the question remains unsettled.
From these various institutional conditions characterizing 
the process of wage setting, I believe we may conclude that the 
U.S. have an extremely decentralized system of wage bargaining, 
Germany represents an intermediate case, and Sweden has one of 
the highest degrees of centralization of wage bargaining among 




























































































countries is shared with several authors (Blyth, 1979; Schmitter, 
1981; Cameron, 1984; Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988) .
Differences in the degree of centralization of wage setting 
in the U.S., Germany, and Sweden may be reflected in a different 
inter-industry wage structure in the three countries. Swedish 
labour market policy should imply relatively small wage 
differentials among workers in different industries, while the 
U.S. should represent the opposite extreme, having no central 
bargaining or policy restraint. In Germany the industry specific 
character of negotiations and policies, somehow mitigated by a 
tendency to the diffusion of institutional innovations across 
sectors, should create an intermediate situation. To what extent 
different degrees of centralization are associated with a 
different degree of wage dispersion is an empirical issue that 
I will address in the following sections.
4. The Inter-indnstrv Wage Structure with Aggregate Industry Wage
Pat 3
One of the findings from the U.S. literature which is often 
put forward as supportive of non-competitive explanations for 
industry wage differences is the stability of the wage structure 
across time and countries (Krueger and Summers, 1987; Katz and 
Summers, 1989) .
The results that I discuss in this section are derived from 
a study by Krueger and Summers, where the authors present, among 
other things, some empirical evidence for inter-industry wage 
differentials based on aggregate industry wage data (Krueger and 
Summers, 1987, pp.21-28).
The authors start considering the stability of wage 
differentials over time in the U.S., by comparing aggregate log 
average annual earnings of full-time equivalent employees in nine 
major industries for selected years between 1984 and 1900. The 
industries are agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction, 
transportation, communications, wholesale and retail trade, FIRE 
(finance, insurance and real estate), and services. Their results 





























































































Industry wage structure through time in the U.S.: estimated 
correlation coefficients3, respective standard errorsb, and 99% 
confidence intervals for log average annual earnings of full-time 










1984 1.000 0.000 1.000 - 1.000
1980 0.984 0.016 0.942 - 1.026
1975 0.961 0.039 0.861 - 1.061
1970 0.909 0.084 0.693 - 1.125
1965 0.898 0.093 0.659 - 1.137
1960 0.893 0.097 0.644 - 1.142
1955 0.893 0.097 0.644 - 1.142
1950 0.866 0.117 0.565 - 1.167
1945 0.891 0.098 0.638 - 1.144
1940 0.836 0.137 0.482 - 1.190
1935 0.793 0.164 0.370 - 1.216
1930 0.761 0.182 0.291 - 1.231
1925 0.801 0.159 0.390 - 1.212
1920 0.807 0.156 0.406 - 1.208
1915 0.627 0.243 -0.001 - 1.255
1910 0.604 0.252 -0.046 - 1.254
1905 0.636 0.240 0.017 - 1.255
1900 0.616 0.248 -0.023 - 1.255
a Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, p.24, Table 2.2). 
b See Appendix A for details about the estimate of the standard 
error of the correlation coefficient sr with the formula 
suggested by Hotelling (1953) .
° The sample size for the estimate of the correlation
coefficients is n=9. Industries include: agriculture,
manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation,
communications, wholesale and retail trade, FIRE (finance,
insurance and real estate), and services.
d Approximate 2-sided 99% confidence interval, under the 
assumption that (r-p)/sr follows an asymptotically standard 




























































































of log average annual earnings are proposed by Krueger and 
Summers to suggest that the industry wage structure for all 
industries has remained remarkably stable since 1920, with 
correlations with the wage structure in 1984 ranging from 0.76 
to 0.98 (Krueger and Summers, 1987, Table 2.2). Before 1920 the 
pattern of industry wages appears less similar to the 1984 
industry wage structure, but the correlations are still above 
0.60 for all years up to 1900. Taking into account changes in 
industry definitions and sampling errors, this seems to imply, 
according to the authors, that the structure of relative industry 
wages changed only moderately over a very long time interval.
As is well known, however, the significance of simple 
correlation coefficients is sensitive to the sample size 
(Atkinson et al., 1990, pp. 83-89). Given the fact that the 
correlations presented by Krueger and Summers are based on a very 
small sample of only nine pairs of observations - one for each 
industry aggregate - I want to construct a rigorous test for 
their statistical significance. The sampling distribution of the 
correlation coefficient is not well-behaved and several methods 
have been suggested to approximate it.
As a first way to address this issue, I construct two-sided 
99% confidence intervals for the calculated correlation 
coefficients using an estimator of the approximation to the 
standard error of the correlation proposed by Hotelling (1953, 
p.212). The relevant formulae and other details about the 
calculations are given in Appendix A. The results obtained 
applying this method are reported in the last two columns of 
Table I, together with the respective estimated correlations, and 
graphed in Figure I . We can immediately notice the extreme width 
of the confidence intervals in many cases. For example, with a 
sample of only 9 observations, we have a 99% confidence interval 
of about 0.64 for a correlation coefficient equal to 0.616 and 
a 99% confidence interval of about 0.35 for a correlation 
coefficient equal to 0.836. Since the estimated standard error 
is a monotone decreasing function of the sample correlation 
coefficient - for positive values of the sample correlation - it 







































































































































































































observe that for some values of the correlation coefficient we 
are unable to reject the null hypothesis of a population 
correlation equal to zero.
This method, however, is not appropriate for accurate 
hypothesis testing with small samples. The approximation to the 
standard error is a consistent but biased estimator of its 
population counterpart and the correlation coefficient approaches 
a normal distribution only asymptotically and very slowly. This 
can be seen in the last column of Table I from the fact that the 
two-sided 99% confidence intervals thus derived exceed the upper 
limit value of +1 for the correlation coefficient, which means 
that, with a small sample of nine observations, only a very poor 
approximation to a typically skew distribution can be obtained.
An alternative approach, which avoids the problems of 
estimating the sampling error of the correlation coefficient and 
of claiming the normality of its distribution, is suggested by 
Kendall and Stuart (1977, p.416, §16.28). In the particular case 
in which we want to test the null hypothesis p=0 for the 
population correlation, the distribution of the sample 
correlation coefficient can be reduced to a "Student's 
t-distribution". This transformation can be used for a more 
precise hypothesis testing of the significance of the 
correlations presented by Krueger and Summers (1987) . The details 
about the construction of the tests are given in Appendix A. In 
the third and fourth columns of Table II, I report the results 
obtained with the t-transformation of the correlation coefficient 
for the 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis p=0 against the 
alternative hypothesis p>0, which is the relevant one in this 
case since stability of the industry wage structure over time is 
claimed. Outcomes are provided both at the conventional 1% 
significance level and at the more rigorous 0.5% significance 
level, in order to take into account the problem of precision 
that arises from having a very small sample of only 9 pairs of 
observations.
From Table II we observe that, with this method, the null 
hypothesis of a population correlation equal to zero cannot be 





























































































Industry wage structure through time in the U.S.: estimated
correlation coefficients* and tests of their statistical 
significanceb for log average annual earnings of full-time 















1984 1.000 yes yes yes yes
1980 0.984 yes yes yes yes
1975 0.961 yes yes yes yes
1970 0.909 yes yes yes yes
1965 0.898 yes yes yes yes
1960 0.893 yes yes yes yes
1955 0.893 yes yes yes yes
1950 0.866 yes yes yes yes
1945 0.891 yes yes yes yes
1940 0.836 yes yes yes yes
1935 0.793 yes no yes no
1930 0.761 yes no yes no
1925 0.801 yes yes yes yes
1920 0.807 yes yes yes yes
1915 0.627 no no no no
1910 0.604 no no no no
1905 0.636 no no no no
1900 0.616 no no no no
* Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, p.24, Table 2.2).
See Appendix A for details about the construction of the tests
with the: t-transformation and the z-transformation of the
correlation coefficient. 
c See note c to Table I.
d 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis H0: p=0, against the 
alternative hypothesis Hx: p>0. The relevant claim is, in fact, 
that the industry wage structure is stable over time. Only 




























































































level and in six cases at the 0.5% significance level.
This approach based on the t-transformation overcomes the 
difficulty of directly estimating the sampling error of the 
correlation coefficient, but it still relies in some degree on 
the asymptotic properties of its distribution in large samples. 
I therefore consider also a different transformation of the 
correlation coefficient first introduced by Fisher (1921) and 
subsequently improved by Hotelling (1953), which has been 
extensively used in statistical literature for testing the 
significance of observed correlations and for setting confidence 
limits (see Hotelling, 1953). The so-called "Fisher's 
z-transformation" provides a function of the correlation 
coefficient which tends to normality very much faster than the 
correlation coefficient itself and with a standard error almost 
independent of the population correlation. For these reasons, it 
seems particularly appropriate for hypothesis testing with very 
small samples. Appendix A gives the formulae used for the 
z-transformation and the details about the construction of the 
tests. Table II presents in the last two columns the outcomes for 
the 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis p=0 against the 
alternative hypothesis p>0, at the 1% and 0.5% significance 
levels. We can see that, also with this method, some of the 
correlations do not appear statistically significant and that the 
results obtained with the t-transformation are confirmed by the 
z-transformation.
To summarize all the previous findings, it seems that 
Krueger and Summers' assertion about the extreme stability of the 
U.S. wage structure over time is somewhat overstated. If we take 
into account the smallness of the sample they use to compute 
their correlations, conclusions are more ambiguous than what they 
claim.
Further evidence of the regularities characterizing the 
inter-industry wage structure is proposed by Krueger and Summers 
through international wage structure comparisons. The authors 
suggest that a regular pattern in the wage structure for diverse 
countries is evidence that some common aspects of labour markets, 




























































































observed wage differentials. Their correlations of industry wage 
structures between nations refer to average wages in 
manufacturing industries for the various countries in 1982 
(Krueger and Summers, 1987, Table 2.3). Data are drawn from the 
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics. The classification of manufacturing industries, the 
earnings measure and the type of workers covered by these data 
differ somehow across countries. Krueger and Summers describe in 
their data appendix the number of industries available for each 
country (Krueger and Summers, 1987, Table 2.A.1), but they do not 
specify the exact size of the samples actually used to compute 
simple correlations. In the analysis that follows, I assumed the 
sample size to be equal, for each correlation, to the smaller of 
the two numbers of industry sectors available for the pair of 
countries involved in the correlation coefficient (see notes c 
of Table III and of Table A.II in Appendix A). In the first part 
of Table III, I present a sub-set of the results published by the 
authors, limiting my attention to the major industrialized 
Western countries and including the three countries analysed in 
the present study, Germany, Sweden, and the U.S..
Krueger and Summers argue that these correlations show how 
the pattern of relative wages is remarkably similar across 
countries. Their correlations are regarded by them as quite high, 
ranging from about 0.7 to 0.9. Particularly strong seems the 
correlation between log average wages at an aggregate industry 
level in Germany and in the U.S., equal to 0.85, in Germany and 
Sweden, equal to 0.84, in Sweden and in the U.S., equal to 0.82.
In order to assess rigorously the statistical significance 
of the correlation coefficients appearing in Table III, I 
construct hypothesis tests following the approaches previously 
described for both the t-transformation and the z-transformation 
of the correlation coefficient. Details for these transformations 
and the tests are presented again in Appendix A. The results 
obtained for the 1-tailed tests at the 1% and 0.5% significance 
levels are reported in the second part of Table III.
In this case we see that the null hypothesis of a population 





























































































International wage structure: estimated correlation coefficients3 
and tests of their statistical significanceb for log average 
manufacturing wages among countries'1, 1982
Can Fra Jap US Ger UK Nor Swe
Canada 1.00 0.85 0.82 0.92 0.83 0.88 0.67 0.79
France 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.93 0.80 0.84
Japan 1.00 0.89 0.86 0.93 0.80 0.81
US 1.00 0.85 0.95 0.67 0.82
Germany 1.00 0.90 0.74 0.84




Reject Ĥ : p=0 Reject H : p=0
at significance at significance
Correlation3 level: level:
Countries r l%d . 5%d l%d . 5%d
Can,Fra 0.85 yes yes yes yes
Can,Jap 0.82 yes yes yes yes
Can,US 0.92 yes yes yes yes
Can,Ger 0.83 yes yes yes yes
Can,UK 0.88 yes yes yes yes
Can,Nor 0.67 yes yes yes yes
Can,Swe 0.79 yes yes yes yes
Fra,Jap 0.95 yes yes yes yes
Fra,US 0.90 yes yes yes yes
Fra,Ger 0.87 yes yes yes yes
Fra,UK 0.93 yes yes yes yes
Fra,Nor 0.80 yes yes yes yes
Fra,Swe 0.84 yes yes yes yes
Jap,US 0.89 yes yes yes yes
Jap,Ger 0.86 yes yes yes yes
Jap, UK 0.93 yes yes yes yes































































































Reject Hq: p=0 Reject H : p=0
at significance at significance
Correlation” level: level:
Countries r l%d . 5%d l%d . 5%d
Jap,Swe 0.81 yes yes yes yes
US,Ger 0.85 yes yes yes yes
US, UK 0.95 yes yes yes yes
US,Nor 0.67 yes yes yes yes
US,Swe 0.82 yes yes yes yes
Ger,UK 0.90 yes yes yes yes
Ger,Nor 0.74 yes yes yes yes
Ger,Sew 0.84 yes yes yes yes
UK,Nor 0.70 yes yes yes yes
UK,Swe 0.83 yes yes yes yes
Nor,Swe 0.74 yes yes yes yes
* Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, p.26, Table 2.3). 
b See Appendix A for details about the construction of the tests 
with the t-transformation and the z-transformation of the 
correlation coefficient.
° For each country, average manufacturing wages are available for 
the following numbers of industries (see Krueger and Summers, 











Data for international wage comparisons are reported in the ILO 
Yearbook of Labor Statistics (1983).
d 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis H0: p=0, against the
alternative hypothesis Hji p>0. The relevant claim is, in fact, 
that the international wage structure is stable across countries. 




























































































correlations. However, it must be recalled that I have made a 
strong assumption about the size of the samples actually 
considered by Krueger and Summers for their correlation 
coefficients. This assumption is likely to give an overestimate 
of the real sample sizes, given the heterogeneity of the criteria 
used in different countries to classify industry sectors, which 
may affect the degree of comparability1. As I have already 
remarked, the smallness of the samples used to compute 
correlation coefficients may critically reduce their precision. 
For example, if a correlation of 0.67 - as in the case of the 
U.S. and Norway - were in fact computed with a sample of 12 pairs 
of observations, rather than 17, it would not be significantly 
different from zero at the 0.5% significance level1 2. I therefore 
believe that some caution should be used in drawing conclusions 
based on this sort of simple statistics.
Krueger and Summers conclude their analysis of the 
regularities in the inter-industry wage structure asserting:
"The evidence (...) indicates the presence of pervasive 
regularities in the wage structure. A similar industrial pattern 
of wages recurs in different eras and different places (...). 
Such a uniform pattern ought to be explicable without resort to 
highly idiosyncratic factors specific to particular workers, 
industries, times or places. (...) [This] cannot plausibly be 
rationalized without the introduction of non-competitive 
considerations or additional constraints (...)." (Krueger and 
Summers, 1987, p.37) .
Two objections can be raised about these remarks. First, as 
I have tried to suggest in this section, care needs to be 
employed when interpreting the type of evidence provided by the 
authors. The accuracy of the simple correlations obtained by them
1 It seems, for example, that Krueger and Summers (see their
Figure 2.2 on p.27, 1987) used a sample of only 13 pairs of
observations - instead of the 17 theoretically available - for 
the correlation between log average manufacturing wages in the 
U.S. and Japan.




























































































with the smallest samples of data is questionable in several 
cases. The lack of accuracy may be seen in terms of the large 
sampling errors associated with their estimates and this casts 
some doubts about the claimed over-all stability of the wage 
structure across time and space. Second, empirical evidence based 
on average aggregate data may indeed be consistent with 
competitive explanations for inter-industry wage differentials. 
Before the observed wage structure can be regarded as supportive 
of the non-competitive theories, plausible competitive 
rationalizations such as compensating differentials and 
differences in labour quality and productivity - which could 
well lead to a stable pattern of wages across time and countries 
- must be ruled out. A more rigorous attempt to demonstrate the 
existence and measure the importance of industry wage 
differentials of an actually non-competitive nature requires a 
different approach: an empirical analysis based on micro data to 
test the relevance of industry affiliation in explaining relative 
wages after controlling for individual human capital 
characteristics and working conditions. As we will see in the 
following sections, this technique leads to conclusions which 
contradict those emerging from aggregate industry wage data.
5. Empirical Evidence for Germany
5.1 Methodology and Model Specification
My empirical approach is to estimate a standard 
cross-section wage equation in the framework of the earnings 
function of human capital theory, enriched by demographic and 
working conditions variables and by industry dummy variables. In 
order to examine the importance of industry affiliation in 
explaining relative wages, I want to evaluate the effects of 
industry dummy variables after controlling for human capital, 
demographic background, and working conditions as well as 
possible. Under the hypothesis of a competitive model - if the 
list of controls is complete - the estimated coefficients of 




























































































from zero. The general structure of the wage regression model is 
of the following form:
In w±j - x'p + y'y + d'fi + u4j
where wXJ is the wage of individual i in industry j, x± is a 
vector of human capital variables for individual i, yt is a 
vector of demographic and working conditions variables for 
individual i, d̂  is a vector of industry dummy variables for 
industry j affiliation, and u±j is a random disturbance term 
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance o*. The regression parameters P, y and ® are estimated 
with the OLS method.
The existence of statistically significant industry effects 
in a wage regression like (1), however, is not a definite proof 
in support of non-competitive theories of wage determination. 
Unmeasured labour quality differences - such as ability and 
motivation - which might vary systematically across industries 
and unmeasured differences in industry specific working 
conditions which necessitate compensating wage differentials may 
indeed induce biased estimates of the coefficients of the 
industry dummy variables. This may lead to an overestimate of the 
pure industry affiliation effect in explaining the observed wage 
structure. It is therefore crucial to incorporate the whole 
information available from the data in the set of control 
variables included in the wage regression, in the attempt to - 
at least - minimize the bias due to omitted variables.
5.2 Data. Sample Characteristics, and Construction of the 
Variables
The empirical analysis of industry wage differentials in 
Germany is based on individual cross-sectional data from the 1984 
wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) provided by the 
Deutsches Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin). The panel 




























































































of about 5,000 randomly selected households for each year from 
1984 onwards. The survey relies on two different types of 
questionnaire: the first collects information about the household 
as a whole; the second, which is the relevant one for the purpose 
of my study, is addressed to each individual household member 16 
years old or older and contains detailed questions about 
participation in gainful employment. Both Germans and foreigners 
living in Germany are represented in the survey3.
The wage variable I want to use in my regression analysis 
is a measure of standard hourly earnings for salaried workers 
regularly employed in agricultural, industrial and service firms, 
both in the private and in the public sector. The measure of 
earnings available in the data set is not independent from the 
hours of work, which may vary across individuals, firms, and 
sectors. Usual hourly earnings provide therefore a measure of the 
wage rate which is more properly comparable across industries. 
Moreover, I consider only regularly salaried workers, since the 
focus of the present study is on the behaviour of employers and 
their employees in the process of wage determination. I also 
decided to concentrate on a sample of male workers only, to avoid 
the problem of self selection connected with female labour 
supply.
The initial sample of all male individuals 16 years old or 
older contains 6,007 observations. The sub-sample I analyse is 
composed of German and foreign male employees selected according 
to the following criteria:
i) individuals younger than 65 years, the normal age of 
retirement in Germany - this selection reduces the sample to
3 The number of foreigners included in the survey sample is 
over-representative of the actual proportion of foreigners in the 
population. In the sub-sample of workers used in the present 
study, foreigners are about 39% of the whole sub-sample. This is 
due to the purpose of the SOEP of providing a specific sample of 
foreigners which is by itself representative of the entire 
universe of foreign residents in Germany. In order to take this 
peculiarity of the survey into account, I construct, for my 
regression analysis, special variables apt to capture at least 
a part of the distinctive aspects of foreign workers human 
capital - such as the variables for modelling foreign education 




























































































5,498 observations (about 92% of the initial sample);
ii) full-time or regular part-time private and public employees, 
excluding individuals not in the labour force, unemployed and 
irregularly employed workers - this selection reduces the sample 
to 4,141 observations (about 69% of the initial sample, with a 
reduction of -25% with respect to the previous sub-sample);
iii) blue- and white-collar workers, excluding professional men, 
self-employed workers, trainees and civil servants qualified as 
"Beamten”, who being public officials are subject to peculiar 
regulations affecting their position in the labour market (e.g. 
clerical officers, judges, career military personnel) - this 
selection reduces the sample to 3,368 observations (about 56% of 
the initial sample, with a reduction of -19% with respect to the 
previous sub-sample);
iv) employees working a fixed number of hours per week, for whom 
the measure of usual hourly earnings is more exactly determined 
and less subject to measurement errors - this selection reduces 
the sample to 3,240 observations (about 54% of the initial 
sample, with a reduction of -4% with respect to the previous 
sub-sample).
For the empirical construction of the wage rate variable, 
a measure of earnings and a measure of hours of work are 
required. The relevant information on earnings given in the 
questionnaire refers to gross earnings in the month preceding 
that of the interview, excluding special payments - such as 
vacation bonuses or back pay - but including pay for overtime. 
Two different measures of hours worked are given: hours actually 
worked weekly, on average, in the month preceding that of the 
interview, including overtime, and normal hours worked weekly, 
excluding overtime. Both measures include transitory components, 
such as sick time or vacation days, as normal work time. There 
is a possible problem in computing standard hourly earnings that 
arises due to the non-linearity of total earnings as a function 
of hours actually worked when overtime work is done4. I
4 Even if a constant wage rate is earned over all hours 
normally worked each week, this need not imply that the wage rate 




























































































therefore consider only a sub-sample of straight-time employees, 
defined as individuals who did not work overtime hours in the 
relevant period5. The wage rate variable is thus constructed as 
gross earnings in the last month divided by four times the normal 
hours worked weekly, where neither the earnings measure nor the 
hours of work measure are affected by overtime work. I first 
eliminate from the sample all the observations for which 
information on earnings and/or hours of work are missing. This 
reduces the sample to 2,945 observations (about 49% of the 
initial sample, with a reduction of -9% with respect to the 
previous sub-sample). Then I eliminate individuals who report 
normal hourly earnings less than 1 DM, considered to be outliers. 
This reduces the sample by only 1 observation. The subsequent 
selection of the sub-sample of straight-time employees leads to 
a final sample size of 2,072 observations (about 34% of the 
initial sample, with a reduction of -30% with respect to the 
previous sub-sample).
The exclusion of overtime workers from the sub-sample, 
however, may raise two problems related to the possible 
non-randomness of the selected sample. First, it might be the 
case that overtime workers are not proportionally distributed 
across industries. A higher wage rate might be systematically 
associated with more compensated overtime work6 or, on the 
contrary, the usual wage rate might be relatively lower for 
individuals who do work overtime7. In both cases, the exclusion
average wage rate. It may therefore be that additional hours 
worked overtime would change the marginal and the average wage 
rate. Unfortunately, the SOEP does not provide information on 
this issue, but only a measure of total earnings including 
payments for overtime work.
5 There is an additional reason to prefer an analysis of the 
straight-time sample. Earnings due to overtime work and 
especially hours actually worked weekly on average in the last 
month - including overtime hours - are likely to be seriously 
affected by measurement errors.
6 This implies a positive wage elasticity of overtime labour 
supply in face of short-run adjustments on the demand side.
1 Some indirect evidence of this negative wage elasticity of 




























































































of employees doing overtime work may disproportionately reduce 
the number of observations only in certain sectors - only in high 
wage sectors or low wage sectors respectively - thus reducing the 
precision of the respective estimated industry differentials. 
Second, such segmentation of the sample raises a serious risk of 
selection bias. The sample selection rule that determines the 
availability of data for the wage regression - only a sub-sample 
of straight-time workers is considered - may have critical 
consequences on the estimated coefficients. If observations are 
not excluded randomly, the wage function estimated on the 
selected sample confounds the parameters of interest with the 
parameters of the function determining the probability of 
entrance into the sample - i.e., the probability of not working 
overtime hours in the relevant period (Heckman, 1979) . Under 
these circumstances, the OLS method gives biased estimates of the 
parameters of the wage equation and, among these, of the 
parameters relative to the industry dummy variables, which may 
lead to an incorrect evaluation of the relevance of industry 
affiliation in explaining relative wages.
A way to address the first problem is to construct a 
chi-square test to compare the distribution of employees across 
industries for the selected sub-sample with the distribution of 
employees across industries for a sample including both 
straight-time and overtime employees. The test gives the 
following result8:
X2 (3 5 )  -  1 6 . 9 9 6  < x!oi <3 5 > “ 5 7 . 3
We cannot therefore reject the null hypothesis of identical 
distributions and this can be interpreted as a signal that the 
overtime workers excluded from the sub-sample are proportionally
8 The classification of industry sectors considered for this 
chi-square test is the original one provided by the SOEP, which 
consists of 36 different industries. In my later regression 
analysis I use a different classification, an aggregation of the 




























































































distributed across industry sectors.
As far as the second problem is concerned, given the 
possibly serious effects arising from a sample selection bias, 
I adopt a rigorous treatment using the technique suggested by 
Heckman (1979). Heckman's two-stage estimator is consistent even 
when non-randomly selected samples are used to estimate 
behavioural relationships with simple regression methods, like 
least squares. The model that I in fact consider is not simply 
represented by equation (1) , but by the following two equation 
system with a selection criterion equation:
In w, - x'p y'y + d'6 ( 1 )
ot* - v^a + et ( 2 )
where equation (1) is defined as above, while ot* is an 
unobserved index variable indicating the desired amount of 
overtime work done in the relevant period by individual i, vt is 
a vector of explanatory variables for the overtime work of 
individual i, and et is a random disturbance term normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance oj. The joint 
distribution of ula and e L is a bivariate normal and their 
covariance is oue. Observations on the wage rate wAJ are included 
in the sub-sample if ot*=0, while if otj>0 they are excluded.
In the case of independence between u±J and e± (<Jue=0) t so 
that the observations on w1} would be randomly excluded from the 
sub-sample, least squares estimators might be used to estimate 
ft, y and 8 on the selected sample and the only cost of having an 
incomplete sample would be a loss in efficiency. But in the case 
of overtime work as a selection criterion, the probability of 
including observations on wla in the sub-sample may vary with its 
value, or with the values of variables affecting w±j; then the 
probability of observing w1;j will depend on u±j, ou<> will be 
different from zero and the sub-sample wage regression function 




























































































these circumstances, least squares estimators of p, y and ® in 
equation (1) estimated on the selected sample will be biased, as 
in an ordinary problem of omitted variables (Heckman, 1979) 9. An 
important source of selection bias is represented by the omission 
of variables in not contained in xt, ylf or dJ - variables
affecting the probability of observing w1;), but not wtj directly 
- but correlated with these included variables. A symptom of 
selection bias is in fact that variables that do not belong to 
the true structural wage equation - variables in not in x±, y±, 
or dj - may appear to be statistically significant determinants 
of w when they are incorrectly included as regressors in the 
wage equation and the wage regression is fitted on the selected 
sample (Heckman, 1979, p.155).
The selection rule implies that observations are excluded 
from the sub-sample if any overtime work is done, independently 
of its amount. In the context of my sample selection model, I am 
therefore interested in the probability that employees work any 
positive amount of overtime hours. I then build, for otj, the 
counterpart binary variable otj according to the following 
criterion:
ott - 1 if ot' > 0
otj - 0 if ot' s 0
which substituted in equation (2) gives the binary probit 
selection equation:
ot1 - v^o + ex (2')
Individuals then enter the sub-sample used to estimate equation
9 Moreover, if oue*0, the usual formulae for standard errors 
of least squares coefficients are not appropriate: they 
understate the true standard errors and overstate estimated 




























































































(1) when otj is equal to 0, while they are eliminated when otA is 
equal to 1.
The solution proposed by Heckman (1979) consists of the 
following three steps:
i) apply probit analysis to equation (2' ) for the full sample, 
to estimate the parameters of the probability that ot1=l - the 
probability that any amount of overtime work is done - i.e., to 
estimate a/oe;
ii) for each observation, estimate the Heckman's A. in the form 
which is appropriate to the case of selection on the value 0 for
oti:
-
using the probit estimated coefficients for «/oe; all of these 
estimators are consistent;
iii) estimate equation (1) with OLS for the selected sub-sample, 
regressing In v l on x L, yx, dj( and the estimated value of Xl ;  
regression estimators of equation (1) are consistent for 
P, y, d, and oue/oe - the coefficients of x1# y L, dJ( and 
respectively.
The sample selection bias introduced by eliminating 
employees working overtime hours is significant only if the 
coefficient for A± in the wage regression (°ua/°e) is 
significantly different from zero, since this implies a 
significant covariance (oue*0) between the wage regression and 
the selection equation disturbances u13 and e1.
As far as the choice of explanatory variables in equations 
(1) and (2') is concerned, the set of human capital, demographic 
background, and working conditions controls used in the wage 
equation (x, and yt) includes: age, age squared, tenure in the 




























































































education, 5 dummies for foreign education, 9 skill dummies, the 
number of nights spent in a hospital in the previous year as a 
measure of health conditions, 4 marital status dummies (married, 
living with spouse; married, permanently separated; divorced; 
widowed), the degree of satisfaction with the current job in a 
scale from 1 to 1010, and 3 dummy variables for the size of the 
firm of current employment. The vector of variables that permits 
evaluation of the relevance of industry affiliation in explaining 
relative wages (d^ includes 25 industry dummies.
The set of explanatory variables used in the overtime work 
probability equation (v1) consists both of variables not included 
in the wage equation - assumed to affect the probability of 
working overtime hours but not affecting the wage rate directly 
- and of variables also included in the wage equation - assumed 
to influence simultaneously the probability of working overtime 
hours and the wage rate. The sub-set of non-overlapping variables 
is: the number of children under the age of 16 years living in 
the household, a dummy variable for a second house/apartment in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, a dummy variable for mortgages 
on the house/apartment which is the main residence of the 
household, and 5 nationality dummies. The sub-set of overlapping 
variables includes: age, age squared, 9 skill dummies, the number 
of nights spent in a hospital in the previous year, the degree 
of satisfaction with the current job, 3 dummy variables for the 
size of the firm of current employment, and the 25 industry 
dummies.
Other variables are used both in the wage equation and in 
the overtime work probability equation to deal with the problem 
of missing values. Instead of excluding observations with missing 
values in any of the explanatory variables - that would reduce 
further on the sample size (for example, missing values for 
industry affiliation are 191, 9.2% of the observations in the 
selected sub-sample) - I prefer to introduce a separate dummy 
variable for missing data about education, tenure, marital 
status, nationality, and industry affiliation. Dummy variables
10 On the use of job satisfaction as an economic variable in 




























































































for missing values of education, tenure, and marital status are 
later eliminated from the model because their estimated 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero - that is, 
the effect of education, tenure, and marital status for 
individuals with missing values is not statistically different 
from the effect of the same variables for individuals whose 
characteristics define the base group of each dummy variable - 
and because their omission do not affect the other estimated 
coefficients.
Two different specifications of the sample selection model 
expressed by equations (1) and (2') are estimated: the first is 
the general model, which includes both control variables (x± and 
yp and industry dummies (dp in the wage equation (1); the 
second is a restricted model, which involves only industry dummy 
variables (dp in the wage equation (1) . In both specifications, 
equation (2') has the same form. With respect to the selection 
bias problem, the estimates give the following results: the 
coefficient for XL in the wage equation fit on the selected 
sample for the general model is not significantly different from 
zero (estimated oue/oe is -0.070, with a t-statistic of -0.90), 
indicating that I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no sample 
selection bias induced by the exclusion of employees working 
overtime hours; the coefficient for in the wage equation for 
the restricted model is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level (estimated o /o is -0.164, with a t-statistic of 
-2.59), which implies that, in this case, I reject the null 
hypothesis of no sample selection bias. This last outcome is not 
unexpected: in the restricted model I exclude variables from the 
wage equation (the controls x L and yp which, as we will see, are 
statistically significant determinants of the wage rate and many 
of these controls (the sub-set of overlapping variables in vp 
enter as explanatory variables the overtime work probability 
equation; X±, as a function of v , proxies the effect on wages of 
these controls and hence its coefficient appears statistically 
significant in the wage equation merely because of their 
exclusion from the equation. Also in the case of the restricted 




























































































estimates of the parameters of equation (1) . The detailed results 
for the estimated probit overtime work equation and for the 
estimated wage equations, including among the regressors, are 
presented in Appendix B.
5.3 Basic Results
In Table IV I report the results of cross-section estimates 
of inter-industry wage differentials in a sample selection model 
for an aggregation of three-digit industries according to the 
German industry classification, which is nearly comparable with 
the two-digit classification used by the other authors. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of usual hourly earnings in 
the month of reference. As suggested by Krueger and Summers 
(1988), the estimated industry wage differentials are reported 
as deviations from the employment-weighted mean differential; 
that is, I calculate the employment-weighted average of wage 
differentials for all industries from the wage regression - 
treating the omitted industry variable as having zero effect on 
wages - and report the difference between the industry 
differentials and the weighted average differential. The 
resulting statistics therefore are the proportionate difference 
in wages between an employee in a given industry and the average 
employee in the whole economy. Again following Krueger and 
Summers (1988, p.267), to summarize the overall variability in 
industry wages I present the employment-weighted adjusted 
standard deviation of the industry wage differentials11.
11 The adjustment is required because the estimated industry 
wage differentials include a least squares sampling error, which 
leads to an upward bias in the standard deviation of wage 
differentials (Krueger and Summers, 1988, p.267). The standard 
deviation is adjusted using the formula:
SD (8)
K
var (8) - Y , d)/K 
N j-i
where is the estimate of the true wage differential 5 of 





























































































Estimated wage differentials in a sample selection model for 
two-digit industries, 1984: deviations from the 









1. Energy, Water and Mining .131 .113
(5.32) (3.66)
2. Chemical .136 .085
(5.78) (3.39)
3. Rubber -.095 -.005
(2.42) (1.65)
4 . Stone, Clay and Glass -.009 .037
(3.48) (2.37)
5. Iron and Steel -.053 .021
(3.53) (2.47)
6. Machinery, Excl. Elec. .049 .061
(4.92) (3.21)
7. Electrical Machinery .062 .030
(4.86) (2.50)
8. Lumber, Wood, Paper and -.092 .038
Printing (2.71) (2.60)
9. Textile and Apparel -.046 .014
(3.20) (2.09)
10 . Food, Beverages and Tobacco -.132 -.101
(2.15) (.14)
11 . Construction -.035 .044
(3.77) (2.91)
12 . Wholesale Trade .021 -.078
(3.43) (.44)
13.. Retail Trade -.186 -.104
(1.48) (.09)
14 . Railroads -.072 -.070
(2.22) (.50)
15,. Mail Service -.014 .011
(2.68) (1.51)
16.. Other Transport and .002 -.011
Communications (3.79) (1.67)
17.. Banking .078 -.094
(4.12) (.22)
18 . Insurance .386 .163
(6.28) (3.37)






































































































20. Entertainment .237 -.016
(6.22) (1.45)
21. Health Services .037 -.112
(3.77) (-.05)
22. Legal and Business Services .277 .064
(5.42) (2.19)
23. Non-profit Organizations .092 -.061
and Private Households (4.25) (.70)
24. Local Collective .023 -.047
Organizations (4.23) (1.08)
25. Social Security .095 -.059
(3.30) (.57)
Weighted Adjusted Standard 
Deviation of Differentialsb
.146 .072
F-statistics for No Industry 
Effect
9.768" 5.618"
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.515
Sample Size 2,072 2,072
3 Controls include age and its square, tenure and its square, 
five German education dummies, five foreign education dummies, 
nine skill dummies, four marital status dummies, a measure of 
health conditions, degree of satisfaction, and three firm-size 
dummies.
b Weights are employment shares for each industry.
*' F test that industry wage differentials jointly equal 0 
rejects at the 1% level. The 1% critical points are 
F 01 (26,2044)-1.76 for the regression without control variables 
and F 01 (26,2012)«1.76 for the regression with control variables. 
The number of restrictions (degrees of freedom for the numerator) 
refers to the coefficients of 25 dummy variables for industrial 





























































































The results presented in Table IV are obtained using as 
weights employment shares by industry derived from national 
census statistics for the whole economy (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
1984). I also tried as weights employment shares by industry as 
resulting from within the sample used for my regression analysis. 
With these two sets of weights, I obtained only minor differences 
in the levels of industry wage differentials as deviations from 
the employment-weighted mean differential* 12 and nearly identical 
employment-weighted adjusted standard deviations of industry wage 
differentials13. This seems to confirm that the sample used in 
the present study is representative of the underlying population 
in terms of distribution of employees across industries.
Column I of Table IV presents raw wage differentials, that 
is industry wage differentials estimated without controlling for 
human capital, demographic and working conditions. The industry 
dummy variables are jointly statistically significant (the 
appropriate F-statistic is 9.768, significant at the 1% level 
being the critical 1% point F 01 (26,2044)-1.76) . Industry dummies 
are also statistically significant individually in 24 of the 25 
cases at the 5% level and in 20 cases also at the 1% level. 
Estimates of the industry wage differentials range from -52 
percent in the personal services sector, to +39 percent in the 
insurance sector. The employment-weighted adjusted standard 
deviation of raw industry wage differentials is 14.6 percent. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Krueger and 
Summers (1987, Table 2.4), where inter-country comparisons based
Krueger and Summers, I neglect the covariance terms.
12 For the differentials of column I, the use of sample 
employment shares as weights gives wage differentials that exceed 
those obtained with population employment shares by 0.007; for 
the differentials of column II, the use of population employment 
shares gives wage differentials that exceed those obtained with 
sample employment shares by 0.010.
13 For the differentials of column I, the use of population 
and sample employment shares as weights gives employment-weighted 
adjusted standard deviations equal to 0.146 and 0.147 
respectively; for the differentials of column II, the 





























































































on industry aggregate data show for Germany a standard deviation 
of log average earnings of 14.1 percent in 198214.
Column II of Table IV presents estimated industry wage 
differentials when control variables for human capital and 
working conditions are introduced in the wage equation (see 
Appendix B, Table B.II for the parameter estimates of the control 
variables in the wage regression). With respect to raw industry 
differentials, 17 of the 25 differentials decrease in absolute 
size, with a mean relative reduction of about 48%; however, the 
other 8 differentials exhibit a considerable increase in absolute 
size, so that the overall mean relative change due to the 
introduction of controls is a growth of differentials of about 
24%. In 14 of the 25 cases the differentials change in sign and 
only 5 of these remain significant in the wage regression with 
the controls. Estimates of industry differentials range from -32 
percent in the personal services sector, to +16 percent in the 
insurance sector, the same sectors as in the case of raw 
differentials. It seems therefore that the addition of controls 
alters to a certain extent the pattern of wage differences. 
Industry dummies are statistically significant in 12 out of 25 
industries at the 5% level and in 7 cases also at the 1% level. 
They are also jointly significant at the 1% level (the 
appropriate F-statistic is 5.618, whereas the critical 1% point 
is F (26,2012) -1.76) . Controlling for worker characteristics 
also reduces significantly the estimated inter-industry wage 
dispersion. The employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation 
of industry wage differentials falls to 7.2 percent.
We can observe that, differently from the U.S. case
14 Krueger and Summers (1987, Table 2.4) provide the 
standard deviation of log average earnings among 24 manufacturing 
industries computed with aggregate annual data by industry. The 
earnings measure is earnings per hour, where earnings include 
wages and all wage supplements. Data are derived from the ILO 
Yearbook of Labor Statistics (1983) . Their standard deviation of 
log earnings based on aggregate data - as a measure of wage 
dispersion - is comparable with my employment-weighted adjusted 
standard deviation of raw earnings differentials estimated in a 
regression based on individual data, where the dependent variable 





























































































illustrated by Krueger and Summers (1987 and 1988), raw industry 
wage differentials are not a very satisfactory approximation of 
the differentials obtained when control variables are introduced. 
This can be seen in Figure II, where the plot of wage 
differentials estimated with controls against wage differentials 
estimated without controls does not show a very strong positive 
linear relationship. The Pearson correlation between the 
estimated wage differentials in column I and II of Table IV - a 
measure used by Krueger and Summers (1987, p.19) to claim the 
stability of the pattern of industry wages with respect to 
controls15 - is 0.73, significantly different from zero at the 
0.005% level. An alternative way to verify whether controls have 
an impact on the ranking of industry wage differences is to 
compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. For the German 
case, the rank correlation of the differentials estimated with 
and without controls is 0.45, which is not significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level16. Differences in observed 
labour quality and working conditions seem to explain a 
considerable part of the variability of wages among industries. 
When human capital and working conditions controls are introduced 
in the wage regression, the standard error of the regression is 
reduced by 30 percent (from 0.338 to 0.237), the adjusted R2 
increases from 10 percent to 52 percent and the 
employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of differentials 
is reduced from 15 to 7 percent.
The general conclusion seems to be that although the size, 
significance, and dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials 
may cast some doubts on the standard competitive model of the
15 "It is clear that the addition of these controls barely 
alters the ranking of industry wage differences. Indeed the 
correlation of the industry wage differentials estimated with and 
without controls is 0.95." (Krueger and Summers, 1987, p.19). I 
verified that this correlation is significantly different from 
zero at the 0.005% level.
16 Using the results by Krueger and Summers (1987, Table 
2.1), I computed the rank correlation for the U.S. case. This is 
also equal to 0.95, significantly different from zero at the 
0.005% level. The claim of no impact of controls on the pattern 


























































































































































































labour market, human capital and working conditions factors play 
a crucial role in explaining the observed wage structure in 
Germany.
Two important caveats should be also taken into account in 
evaluating my findings. On the one hand, estimated industry 
differentials may appear smaller than the true differentials of 
non-competitive nature because of the inclusion of firm size 
variables among the controls in the wage equation. Both 
efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories, in fact, predict 
a positive relationship between firm size and wages: in the 
context of the efficiency wage model, turnover and monitoring 
costs may be higher in larger than in smaller firms and thus the 
efficiency wage may increase with firm size (Salop, 1973) ; in the 
context of the insider-outsider model, labour is expected to be 
better organized in large firms and thus insiders may be able to 
obtain a larger profit share (Weiss, 1966) . There is some 
evidence for Germany supporting non-competitive explanations of 
the observed firm size-wage effect (Schmidt and Zimmermann, 
1990) . Whatever the underlying theoretical reason, firm size 
variables may "pick-up” some aspects of a non-competitive process 
of wage determination and therefore reduce the estimated industry 
affiliation effect.
On the other hand, estimated industry differentials may 
appear larger than the true differentials of non-competitive 
nature because of unobservable labour characteristics. In an 
approach based on the estimate of an earnings function like 
equation (1), unobservable characteristics which vary 
systematically across industries may produce upward biased 
estimates of the coefficients of the industry dummy variables, 
thus overstating the actual importance of industry affiliation 
in explaining the structure of wages. This problem seems even 
more serious in the German case than in the U.S. case, since here 
observable characteristics do have a substantial impact on 
relative wages17.
17 Krueger and Summers (1987) find for the U.S. case that 
controlling for observable characteristics of workers does not 




























































































Inter-country comparisons of the sort presented in section 
4 to claim stability of the wage structure rely on the hypothesis 
that average wage differentials as emerging from aggregate data 
are a good approximation of the wage differentials that would 
result when all compensating differentials for labour quality and 
working conditions are controlled for. As I have already 
mentioned, there is some evidence supporting this hypothesis for 
the U.S. case. This leads Krueger and Summers (1987) to conclude:
"The finding (...) allows for the comparison of industry 
wages over time and across countries with aggregate industry wage 
data since it is unlikely that controls would change the pattern 
of industry wages in these data." (Krueger and Summers, 1987,
p.20) .
However, as we have seen in the present section, this hypothesis 
does not seem a realistic one for the German case. Even in an 
approach that cannot exclude compensating differentials for 
unobservable human capital characteristics and working 
conditions, observable labour quality controls explain a large 
amount of the variability of wages across industries and modify 
the pattern of inter-industry wage differentials.
In the following section, I will therefore consider 
inter-country comparisons based on results obtained with micro 
data and contrast the emerging conclusions with those drawn from 
evidence based on aggregate industry wage data.
6. Comparisons with the U.S. and Swedish Evidence Based on Micro 
Data
In this section I will compare my results based on micro 
data for Germany with those of analogous work for the U.S. 
(Krueger and Summers, 1987 and 1988) and for Sweden (Edin and
unmeasured aspects of labor quality are only weakly correlated 
with tenure, age and education, and are far more important than 
measurable aspects, it is hard to see how they could account for 
inter-industry wage differences." (Krueger and Summers, 1987, 




























































































Zetterberg, 1989). When moving from aggregate to individual level 
data, we will see that differences between countries, rather than 
similarities, tend to emerge.
The three empirical studies use a similar approach: a wage 
equation - the logarithm of usual hourly earnings as a function 
of controls for human capital and working conditions and of 
industry dummies - estimated from a cross-sectional regression 
on individual data for 1984 with the OLS method. However, the 
degree of comparability between countries is affected by several 
differences in the definition of the samples of interest and of 
the dependent and explanatory variables, as well as in the 
statistical methodology applied for the estimate of the model.
The U.S. data are derived from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), collected by the Bureau of Census for May 1984. CPS 
contains labour force data for members of the sampled households 
who are 14 years old or older. The sub-sample used by Krueger and 
Summers (1987 and 1988) in their regression analysis consists of 
full and part-time private non-agricultural employees 16 years 
old or older. Both male and female workers are included. 
Employees who report hourly earnings smaller than $1.00 or 
greater than $250.00 are considered to be outliers and eliminated 
from the sample. The authors obtain in this way a sub-sample of 
11,512 individuals from a nationwide representative sample 
(10,289 individuals for the estimates of raw industry 
differentials in Krueger and Summers, 1987) . The dependent 
earnings variable is defined as usual weekly earnings in the 
relevant month (May 1984) divided by usual weekly hours of work 
in the same time period.
Data for Sweden are obtained by Edin and Zetterberg (1989) 
from the HUS-Survey for 1984, which contains labour force and 
work place related data for members of about 1,500 households. 
A sub-sample is selected for full and part-time employees in 
public and private sectors. Both male and female workers are 
included. Observations with missing values in any of the 
dependent or explanatory variables are eliminated from the 
sample. A sub-sample of 1,298 individuals is thus obtained from 




























































































log of the hourly wage rate, calculated as usual weekly (or other 
time units) earnings divided by usual hours of work for the 
corresponding time unit.
The other authors do not provide more information about the 
procedure of sample selection and the construction of the 
dependent variable. In particular, they do not specify anything 
about the treatment of overtime workers and ignore the possible 
consequences in terms of selection bias of any of the selection 
criteria. Moreover, the choice of including both male and female 
employees in the selected samples and a dummy variable for sex 
among the control variables does not seem particularly 
appropriate, because it neglects the problem of self selection 
connected with female labour supply.
With respect to the sets of control variables18, the major 
differences between the German and the U.S. studies are 
represented by the inclusion among the controls for the U.S. case 
of a dummy variable for union membership and by the exclusion of 
firm size variables and of any other control for working 
conditions. Union membership and firm size variables are both 
likely to "pick-up" non-competitive influences on industry wages. 
With respect to the Swedish case, the main difference consists 
in a richer set of working conditions and work-place related 
controls, likely to "pick-up" both competitive and 
non-competitive aspects of the process of wage determination. 
Other minor differences in the sets of control variables mainly 
reflect peculiar institutional conditions characterizing the
18 The set of explanatory variables for the U.S. case 
includes: education and its square, 6 age dummies, 8 occupation 
dummies, 3 region dummies, sex, race, central city, union 
membership, marital status, veteran status dummies, several 
interaction terms, and 42 industry dummies.
The set of explanatory variables used in the Swedish case 
includes: education (years of schooling), experience and its 
square, tenure, age, sex, white-collar, native language not 
Swedish dummies, plant size, logarithm of regional unemployment 
rate, 6 shift dummies (3-shift, 2-shift, working weekends, 
working nights, irregular shifts, other shifts), 4 wage-form 
dummies (individual/group/mixed piece-rates, other piece-rates), 
and 26 industry dummies.
For the analysis of the German case, I refer to the list of 




























































































labour markets of the three countries.
Finally, as already noticed, no treatment for sample 
selection bias is contemplated in the U.S. and Swedish studies: 
the simple OLS method is used to provide estimates for the wage 
regressions on the selected samples.
Taking into proper account the limit to the degree of 
comparability arising from all these differences - the most 
serious probably being in the use of a sub-sample of male workers 
only for my analysis of the German case - I will proceed with 
inter-country comparisons considering some aspects of the 
empirical evidence available from the different studies. The 
estimates of raw industry differentials for the three countries 
are summarized in Table V, while Table VI presents industry wage 
differentials estimated with controls for human capital and 
working conditions. A further limit in the actual comparison is 
represented by the differences in the industry sectors 
classifications used in the U.S., Germany, and Sweden. I 
therefore preferred to consider, for each country, a sub-set of 
industries which are fairly similar according to the definition 
of each sector, even at the cost of oversimplifying the 
comparison to a certain extent.
A first relevant difference between Germany and the U.S. and 
between Germany and Sweden is the magnitude of industry wage 
differentials. German evidence shows industry differentials 
which, in absolute size, are smaller than the differentials in 
the U.S. and larger than those in Sweden in the majority of 
industries, both in terms of raw differentials and when control 
variables are introduced in the wage regression. Germany 
therefore represents an intermediate case between the U.S. and 
Sweden.
The three countries also differ in terms of statistical 
significance of individual industry dummies. For the U.S., 
industry dummy variables remain generally statistically 
significant when human capital and working conditions controls 
are introduced in the wage regression. For Germany, almost a half 
of industry dummies (12 out of 25) are statistically significant 





























































































Estimated wage differentials without controls for human capital 
and working conditions for Germany, U.S., and Sweden, 1984: 
deviations from the employment-weighted mean differential 
(unadjusted OLS standard errors in parentheses)




4. Stone, Clay, Glass
5. Iron, Steel
6. Machinery, Excl. Elec.
7. Electrical Machinery
9. Textile, Apparel

















































































































































Industry Germany U.S.a Sweden1"
25. Social Security .095 -.194 -.024
( .121) (.032) (.015)
Weighted Adjusted Standard 
Deviation of Differentials'"
.146 .240 .071
F-statistic for No Industry 
Effect
9.547" N . A . 4.05"
Sample Size 2, 072 10,289 1,298
a Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, pp.20-21, Table 2.1). 
b Source: Edin and Zetterberg (1989, pp.8-9, Table 1).
0 Weights are employment shares for each industry.
F test that industry wage differentials jointly equal 0 





























































































Estimated wage differentials with controls for human capital and 
working conditions for Germany, U.S., and Sweden, 1984: 
deviations from the employment-weighted mean differential 
(unadjusted OLS standard errors in parentheses)




4. Stone, Clay, Glass
5. Iron, Steel
6. Machinery, Excl. Elec.
7. Electrical Machinery
9. Textile, Apparel

















































































































































Industry Germany U.S.* Swedenb
25. Social Security -.059 -.246 -.030
(.088) ( .027) (.059)
Weighted Adjusted Standard 
Deviation of Differentials'
.072 .140 . 012d
F-statistic for No Industry 
Effect
5.618“ N.A." 1.86“
Sample Size 2,072 11,512 1,298
a Source: Krueger and Summers (1988, pp.265-266, Table II). 
b Source: Edin and Zetterberg (1989, pp.8-9, Table 1).
0 Weights are employment shares for each industry. 
d Not computable with the formula in footnote 9, since the 
variance of estimated residuals is less than the average standard 
error. This result is obtained accounting for covariance terms, 
which are elsewhere neglected.
F test that industry wage differentials jointly equal 0 




























































































variables. For Sweden, only three individual dummies are 
significant, even at the 5% level, when a large number of 
individually related and work-place related controls are 
introduced in the wage regression. However, they remain jointly 
statistically significant. It is worth noting that differences 
in the level of significance may simply reflect differences in 
the sample sizes. The standard error of least squares 
coefficients is in fact an increasing function of the inherent 
variability of the dependent variable and a decreasing function 
of the sample size and of the variability of each explanatory 
variable. Thus, other things being equal, a larger sample size 
leads to more accurate estimates and higher significance levels. 
The size of the sample used in the U.S. study (11,512) is about 
6 times the sample size in my analysis of the German case (2,072) 
and about 9 times that of the Swedish study (1,298).
The most striking difference among Germany, the U.S. and 
Sweden is in terms of the variability of wages across industries 
as measured by the employment-weighted adjusted standard 
deviation of industry differentials. Referring to the regression 
where a large number of controls are added, the figures for the 
three countries are respectively 7 percent, 14 percent and 
approximately zero. Germany again is between two extreme 
situations.
A further difference is the relative importance of human 
capital variables and industry variables in the wage equations 
for the three countries. In the U.S. industry variables are very 
important in explaining variations in individual wages. The 
standard error of the regression is reduced by 4.3 percent when 
industry variables are added to a regression that already 
controls for occupation, human capital, and demographic factors. 
In comparison, the standard error falls by 5.1 percent when human 
capital controls are added to the same regression. For Germany, 
when industry variables are introduced into a regression that 
already controls for a number of human capital and working 
conditions the standard error of the regression is reduced by 3.9 
percent, while when human capital controls are added to the same 




























































































different result is instead obtained for Sweden, where the 
reduction in the standard error of the regression due to the 
introduction of industry variables is 0.2 percent, while that due 
to human capital controls is 2.2 percent, more than ten times the 
reduction due to industry variables. This means that in the U.S. 
and in Germany industry variables and human capital controls are 
of nearly equal importance in explaining wage variations, with 
Germany exhibiting a slightly smaller impact of industry 
variables than the U.S., while in Sweden human capital variables 
are relatively much more important, with industry variables 
having almost no effect in the estimated wage equation.
Finally, differences emerge also in the comparison of 
industry wage structures. To get a first idea of the degree of 
stability of the industry wage pattern across countries, Figures 
III, IV, V, and VI present plots of wage differentials in the U.S 
and Germany and in Sweden and Germany, estimated both without and 
with controls for human capital and working conditions. The plots 
do not show the existence of strong positive relationships.
I have also computed the Pearson product-moment correlations 
and the Spearman rank correlations for the industry wage 
differentials appearing in Tables V and VI. For Germany and the 
U.S., the Pearson correlation between raw differentials using 17 
industries is 0.14 (one-sided p-value 0.29) and the rank 
correlation is -0.03 (one-sided p-value 0.54); for Germany and 
Sweden, the Pearson correlation between raw differentials using 
16 industries is 0.39 (one-sided p-value 0.07) and the rank 
correlation is 0.31 (one-sided p-value 0.12). None of these 
correlations are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. When wage differentials estimated with controls are 
considered, I obtain opposite results with respect to those 
presented by Edin and Zetterberg (1989), that is correlation 
coefficients tend to rise. For Germany and the U.S., the Pearson 
correlation is 0.59 (one-sided p-value 0.007) and the rank 
correlation is 0.70 (one-sided p-value 0.001); for Germany and 
Sweden, the Pearson correlation is 0.32 (one-sided p-value 0.11) 
and the rank correlation is 0.46 (one-sided p-value 0.04).
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is worth noting that we are very far from the results obtained 
by Krueger and Summers (1987) with aggregate data, which show 
correlations between log average industry wages equal to 0.85 and 
0.84 for Germany and the U.S. and for Germany and Sweden 
respectively (see Table III in section 4). This indicates that 
the magnitude of correlations between countries may be overstated 
in aggregate data and that a substantial proportion of 
similarities may be due to the correlation of the industry 
distribution of observable and unobservable labour quality and 
job attributes across countries.
Within the limits of the actual comparability of empirical 
evidence for Germany, the U.S. and Sweden, the fact that 
differences between countries, rather than similarities, tend to 
emerge seems to suggest that institutional aspects of the labour 
market, and in particular the degree of centralization of wage 
bargaining, may play an important role in explaining the observed 
pattern of inter-industry wage differentials. The ranking of the 
three countries in terms of degree of centralization is 
consistent with the empirical results for industry wage 
differences estimated with individual data in the framework of 
human capital earnings functions. Union policies aiming at a 
reduction of wage differentials have been successful in Sweden 
and partly in Germany. On the other hand, the lack of centralized 
policies in wage negotiations appears to lead the U.S. towards 
a labour market characterized by wide inter-sectoral 
differentials. These findings are confirmed by additional 
evidence provided by Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991). Using panel 
data on aggregate industry wages for five countries including 
Germany, the U.S. and Sweden, they find that industry wages in 
the U.S. are substantially affected by industry specific 
conditions, while in Sweden these effects are negligible. Germany 
again plays an intermediate role, with substantial industry wage 





























































































The aims of this paper have been to present some empirical 
evidence based on micro data of inter-industry wage dispersion 
for Germany, to compare my results with those provided in two 
similar studies on the U.S. and Sweden, and to attempt an 
explanation of my findings in terms of competitive and 
non-competitive theories of the labour market.
The main conclusions may be summarized as follows. First, 
evidence for Germany shows that workers' quality and other 
compensating factors have an important impact on the observed 
wage structure, although the size, significance, and dispersion 
of inter-industry wage differentials cast some doubts on the 
standard competitive model of the labour market.
Second, comparisons with U.S. and Swedish evidence suggest 
that results obtained with individual data in a regression 
approach highlight differences among countries rather than 
similarities, in contrast to what emerges with aggregate data.
Third, in the class of non-competitive theories of the 
labour market, institutional conditions of wage bargaining and 
in particular the degree of centralization seem to play a 
relevant role in explaining the pattern of inter-industry wage 
differences.
These conclusions are obviously affected by differences in 
the methodology used in the various studies and by the fact that 
only three countries are considered. More evidence for other 
countries obtained with similar approaches would be very useful 





























































































Testing the Statistical Significance of the Correlation 
Coefficient in Small Samples
A variety of approaches have been suggested in the 
literature to approximate the properties of the correlation 
coefficient in samples from a bivariate normal population, since 
it has not a well-behaved sampling distribution (see, for 
example, Kendall and Stuart, 1977).
Hotelling (1953, p.212) proposes the following expression 





1 U p 24 (n-1) - 192P2 + 479P4 ♦ o (n~3) 32(n-1)2
where p is the population correlation coefficient and n is the 
sample size. The terms of order n'3 and higher order become 
negligibly small even for a very small sample size and can 
therefore be ignored.
Following Atkinson et al. (1990, p.87), from Hotelling's 
formula I derive an expression for the estimated standard error 
of the correlation coefficient sr, replacing the population p by 
its sample estimator r:
'
_ 1 - r2 x + H r 2 + - 192r2 + 479r4 
v/^T 4 (n-D 32 (n-1)2 /
Given asymptotic normality of r (Hotelling, 1953), I also 
construct two-sided 99% confidence intervals for the correlation 
coefficients as:




























































































Since r is a consistent estimator of p, it follows that sr 
is also a consistent estimator of o , which means that the 
derivation of sr from Hotelling's expression is valid, but only 
asymptotically. For small samples - like in my case, where n=9 
- the use of this formula to compute sr may entail a considerable 
amount of bias. Moreover, the distribution of the correlation 
coefficient approaches normality very slowly for large samples 
(Kendall and Stuart, 1977, p.416). This may invalidate the
construction of confidence intervals and hypothesis testing based 
on the estimator sr and on the normal distribution for small 
samples.
The results obtained applying this expression for sr and 
using it to construct two-sided 99% confidence intervals for the 
correlation coefficients under the assumption of normality are 
presented in Table I and graphed in Figure I of section 4.
Kendall and Stuart (1977) suggest an alternative technique, 
which is more appropriate for testing if a correlation 
coefficient estimated with a small sample is significantly 
different from zero, since it does not involve the bias deriving 
from a direct estimate of the sampling error sr. This is based on 
the transformation of the distribution function of the sample 
correlation coefficient into a "Student's t-distribution". Under 
the particular null hypothesis p=0, the distribution of the 
correlation coefficient may be obtained indirectly by putting:
i
t - {(n — 2) r2/ (1 -r2))2
which follows a t-distribution with v=n-2 degrees of freedom 
(Kendall and Stuart, 1977, p.416, §16.28). This t-transformation 
of the correlation coefficient is used to construct 1-tailed 
tests of the null hypothesis p=0 against the alternative 
hypothesis p>0.
Tables A. I and A. II present, together with the respective 
estimated correlations, the computed values of t and the outcomes 
for hypothesis testing at the 1% and 0.5% significance levels. 
Table A. I refers to correlations for the analysis of the 





























































































Industry wage structure through time in the U.S.: estimated 
correlation coefficients3 and t-transformationb for log average 












1984 1.000 7 CO yes yes
1980 0.984 7 14.612 yes yes
1975 0.961 7 9.194 yes yes
1970 0.909 7 5.770 yes yes
1965 0.898 7 5.400 yes yes
1960 0.893 7 5.250 yes yes
1955 0.893 7 5.250 yes yes
1950 0.866 7 4.582 yes yes
1945 0.891 7 5.192 yes yes
1940 0.836 7 4.031 yes yes
1935 0.793 7 3.444 yes no
1930 0.761 7 3.104 yes no
1925 0.801 7 3.540 yes yes
1920 0.807 7 3.615 yes yes
1915 0.627 7 2.129 no no
1910 0.604 7 2.005 no no
1905 0.636 7 2.181 no no
1900 0.616 7 2.069 no no
0 Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, p.24, Table 2.2). 
b See Kendall and Stuart (1977, p.416, §16.28): 
t = ( (n-2) r2/ (1-r2) )1/2.
° The sample size for the estimate of the correlation
coefficients is n=9. Industries include: agriculture,
manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation,
communications, wholesale and retail trade, FIRE (finance,
insurance and real estate), and services. 
d Degrees of freedom: v = n-2.
e 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis H0: p=0, against the
alternative hypothesis Hj: p>0. The relevant claim is, in fact, 
that the industry wage structure is stable over time. Only
positive correlations are therefore expected. The 1% critical 





























































































International wage structure: estimated correlation coefficients3 




Correlation" Degrees of level :
Countries r freedomd tb l%e ,5%e
Can,Fra 0.85 18 6.846 yes yes
Can,Jap 0.82 19 6.245 yes yes
Can,US 0.92 15 9.092 yes yes
Can,Ger 0.83 19 6.486 yes yes
Can,UK 0.88 19 8.076 yes yes
Can,Nor 0.67 19 3.934 yes yes
Can,Swe 0.79 19 5.617 yes yes
Fra,Jap 0.95 18 12.908 yes yes
Fra,US 0.90 15 7.997 yes yes
Fra,Ger 0.87 18 7.486 yes yes
Fra,UK 0.93 18 10.735 yes yes
Fra,Nor 0.80 18 5.657 yes yes
Fra,Swe 0.84 18 6.568 yes yes
Jap,US 0.89 15 7.560 yes yes
Jap,Ger 0.86 19 7.346 yes yes
Jap,UK 0.93 19 11.029 yes yes
Jap,Nor 0.80 19 5.812 yes yes
Jap,Swe 0.81 19 6.021 yes yes
US,Ger 0.85 15 6.249 yes yes
US, UK 0.95 15 11.783 yes yes
US,Nor 0.67 15 3.495 yes yes
US,Swe 0.82 15 5.549 yes yes
Ger,UK 0.90 19 9.000 yes yes
Ger,Nor 0.74 22 5.160 yes yes
Ger,Swe 0.84 22 7.261 yes yes
UK,Nor 0.70 19 4.273 yes yes
UK,Swe 0.83 19 6.486 yes yes
Nor,Swe 0.74 24 5.390 yes yes
a Source : Krueger and Summers (1987, p.26, Table 2.3) . 
b See Kendall and Stuart (1977, p.416, §16.28): 






























































































° For each pair of countries, the sample size for the estimate of 
the correlation coefficient is assumed to be (see Krueger and 
Summers, 1987, p.45, Table 2.A.1):
Countries n Countries n Countries n
Can,Fra 20 Fra,UK 20 US,Nor 17
Can,Jap 21 Fra,Nor 20 US,Swe 17
Can,US 17 Fra,Swe 20 Ger,UK 21
Can,Ger 21 Jap,US 17 Ger,Nor 24
Can,UK 21 Jap,Ger 21 Ger,Swe 24
Can,Nor 21 Jap,UK 21 UK,Nor 21
Can,Swe 21 Jap,Nor 21 UK,Swe 21
Fra,Jap 20 Jap,Swe 21 Nor,Swe 26
Fra,US 17 US,Ger 17
Fra,Ger 20 US, UK 17
Data for international wage comparisons are reported in the ILO 
Yearscpk ,p.f...Labar Statistics (1983) . 
d Degrees of freedom: v = n-2.
• 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis H0: p=0, against the
alternative hypothesis : p>0. The relevant claim is, in fact, 
that the international wage structure is stable across countries. 
Only positive correlations are therefore expected. The 1% 
critical points for the various degrees of freedom are:
t (15)=2.60 
t"01 (18) =2.55 
t 01 (19) =2.54 
t oi (22) =2.51 
t '01 (24) =2.49












































































































refers to correlations for international wage structure 
comparisons. The results obtained with this method are those 
reported in Table II and III of section 4 in the columns for the 
t-transformation.
A third approach to the problem of testing the significance 
of estimated correlations is based on another transformation of 
r, introduced by Fisher (1921):
1, ltr
2 g T ^ 7 '
The "Fisher's z-transformation" provides a function of the 
correlation coefficient having a distribution which approaches 
normality with great rapidity and a variance nearly independent 
of the population correlation p. This makes the transformation 
to z particularly useful in testing the significance of the 
deviation of observed correlations from hypothetical values and 
in constructing confidence intervals.
The normalizing and variance-stabilizing properties of z, 
however, are asymptotic ones and its use in very small samples 
may entail considerable errors (Hotelling, 1953)1. I therefore 
adopt the correction for bias in z proposed by Hotelling (1953, 
p.219) and compute the modified formula:
An improved approximation for an unbiased estimate of the 
variance of z is also provided (Hotelling, 1953, p.220) :
1 In particular, for the variance of z Fisher recommends the 
formula:
This simple formula is an approximation and its closeness depends 





























































































n - 3 +
Under the assumption of normality o f  z ' , I can construct 
one-sided 99% and 99.5% confidence intervals as, respectively:
C > z' -2.33s' 
C > z' -2.58 s'
where C is the population parameter corresponding to z'. These 
confidence intervals for z' are then transformed into the 
corresponding one-sided 99% and 99.5% confidence intervals for 
the correlation coefficient r, according to the inverse formula:
r - tanh z ' .
This is easily done using the special table of the transformation 
of z' to r provided by Fisher and Yates (1963, p.63). The 
intervals for r thus obtained are always within the range 
[-1,+1], This means that the method of the z-transformation 
gives, for small samples, a better approximation to the sampling 
distribution of r than the one based on the direct estimate of 
its standard error sr and on the assumption of its asymptotic 
normality - the first approach illustrated in this appendix. 
There we have, in fact, confidence intervals for r exceeding the 
upper limit value of +1, as shown in Table I of section 4.
Confidence intervals for r are finally used for the 1-tailed 
tests of the null hypothesis p=0 against the alternative 
hypothesis p>0, at the 1% and 0.5% significance levels.
Table A. Ill and A. IV present the values of z', sz', the 
confidence intervals for z' and r and the outcomes for hypothesis 
testing at the 1% and 0.5% levels, for the wage structure 
estimated correlations over time and across countries 
respectively. The final results of the tests with the 






























































































Industry wage structure through time in the U.S.: estimated 
correlation coefficients3 and z-transformationb for log average 











one-sided Reject HQ: p-0 
confidence at 1% 
interval significance 
for r leveld
1984 1.000 0.392 00 - 1.000 - 1.000 yes
1980 0.984 2.334 0.393 1.42 - oo 0.890 - 1.000 yes
1975 0.961 1.885 0.393 0.97 - oo 0.749 - 1.000 yes
1970 0.909 1.452 0.395 0.53 - oo 0.485 - 1.000 yes
1965 0.898 1.393 0.395 0.47 - oo 0.438 - 1.000 yes
1960 0.893 1.368 0.395 0.45 - oo 0.422 - 1.000 yes
1955 0.893 1.368 0.395 0.45 - oo 0.422 - 1.000 yes
1950 0.866 1.250 0.396 0.33 - oo 0.319 - 1.000 yes
1945 0.891 1.358 0.395 0.44 - oo 0.414 - 1.000 yes
1940 0.836 1.143 0.397 0.22 - oo 0.217 - 1.000 yes
1935 0.793 1.018 0.398 0.09 - oo 0.090 - 1.000 yes
1930 0.761 0.940 0.399 0.01 - oo 0.010 - 1.000 yes
1925 0.801 1.040 0.398 0.11 - oo 0.110 - 1.000 yes
1920 0.807 1.056 0.398 0.13 - oo 0.129 - 1.000 yes
1915 0.627 0.688 0.402 -0.25 - oo -0.245 - 1.000 no
1910 0.604 0.653 0.402 -0.28 - 00 -0.273 - 1.000 no
1905 0.636 0.703 0.402 -0.23 - 00 -0.226 - 1.000 no












































































































Reject HL: p=0 
at . 5% 
significance 
leveld
1984 1.000 0.392 1.000 - 1.000 yes
1980 0.984 2.334 0.393 1.32 - 00 0.867 - 1.000 yes
1975 0.961 1.885 0.393 0.87 - oo 0.701 - 1.000 yes
1970 0.909 1.452 0.395 0.43 - oo 0.405 - 1.000 yes
1965 0.898 1.393 0.395 0.37 - oo 0.354 - 1.000 yes
1960 0.893 1.368 0.395 0.35 - oo 0.336 - 1.000 yes
1955 0.893 1.368 0.395 0.35 - oo 0.336 - 1.000 yes
1950 0.866 1.250 0.396 0.23 - oo 0.226 - 1.000 yes
1945 0.891 1.358 0.395 0.34 - oo 0.328 - 1.000 yes
1940 0.836 1.143 0.397 0.12 - oo 0.119 - 1.000 yes
1935 0.793 1.018 0.398 -0.01 -0.010 - 1.000 no
1930 0.761 0.940 0.399 -0.09 - 00 -0.090 - 1.000 no
1925 0.801 1.040 0.398 0.01 - 00 0.010 - 1.000 yes
1920 0.807 1.056 0.398 0.03 00 0.030 - 1.000 yes
1915 0.627 0.688 0.402 -0.35 - 00 -0.336 - 1.000 no
1910 0.604 0.653 0.402 -0.38 oo -0.363 - 1.000 no
1905 0.636 0.703 0.402 -0.33 - oo -0.319 - 1.000 no
1900 0.616 0.671 0.402 -0.37 -0.354 - 1.000 no
a Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, p.24, Table 2.2). 
b See Hotelling (1953, §9, p.217-221). 
c See note c to Table A.I.
d 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis H0: p=0, against the 
alternative hypothesis Hx: p>0. The relevant claim is, in fact, 
that the industry wage structure is stable over time. Only 





























































































International wage structure: estimated correlation coefficients3 
and z-transformationb for log average manufacturing wages among 
countries3, 1982
99% 99%
one-sided one-sided Reject Hn: p*0
confidence confidence at 1%
Correlation3 interval interval significance
Countries r z'b for z ' for r leveld
Can,Fra 0.85 1.232 0.240 0.67 - _ 0.585 - 1.000 yes
Can,Jap 0.82 1.135 0.234 0.59 - oo 0.530 - 1.000 yes
Can,US 0.92 1.557 0.263 0.94 - 00 0.735 - 1.000 yes
Can,Ger 0.83 1.166 0.233 0.62 - oo 0.551 - 1.000 yes
Can,UK 0.88 1.352 0.233 0.81 - oo 0.670 - 1.000 yes
Can, Nor 0.67 0.793 0.234 0.25 - 00 0.245 - 1.000 yes
Can,Swe 0.79 1.050 0.234 0.51 - 0.470 - 1.000 yes
Fra,Jap 0.95 1.805 0.239 1.25 - oo 0.848 - 1.000 yes
Fra,US 0.90 1.441 0.263 0.83 - oo 0.681 - 1.000 yes
Fra,Ger 0.87 1.308 0.240 0.75 - 00 0.635 - 1.000 yes
Fra,UK 0.93 1.632 0.240 1.07 - oo 0.790 - 1.000 yes
Fra,Nor 0.80 1.076 0.240 0.52 - oo 0.478 - 1.000 yes
Fra,Swe 0.84 1.197 0.240 0.64 - oo 0.565 - 1.000 yes
Jap,US 0.89 1.391 0.264 0.78 - oo 0.653 - 1.000 yes
Jap,Ger 0.86 1.270 0.233 0.73 - 0.623 - 1.000 yes
Jap,UK 0.93 1.633 0.233 1.09 - oo 0.797 - 1.000 yes
Jap, Nor 0.80 1.077 0.234 0.53 - oo 0.485 - 1.000 yes
Jap,Swe 0.81 1.105 0.234 0.56 - oo 0.508 - 1.000 yes
US,Ger 0.85 1.227 0.264 0.61 - oo 0.544 - 1.000 yes
US, UK 0.95 1.799 0.263 1.19 - oo 0.831 - 1.000 yes
US, Nor 0.67 0.788 0.265 0.17 - oo 0.168 - 1.000 yes
US,Swe 0.82 1.129 0.264 0.51 - 0.470 - 1.000 yes
Ger,UK 0.90 1.448 0.233 0.90 - oo 0.716 - 1.000 yes
Ger,Nor 0.74 0.933 0.217 0.43 - oo 0.405 - 1.000 yes
Ger,Swe 0.84 1.202 0.216 0.70 - 00 0.604 - 1.000 yes
UK,Nor 0.70 0.848 0.234 0.30 - 00 0.291 - 1.000 yes
UK,Swe 0.83 1.166 0.233 0.62 - 00 0.551 - 1.000 yes














































































































Can,Fra 0.85 1.232 0.240 0.61 - OO 0.544 ■ 1.000 yes
Can,Jap 0.82 1.135 0.234 0.53 - OO 0.485 ■ 1.000 yes
Can, US 0.92 1.557 0.263 0.88 OO 0.706 • 1.000 yes
Can,Ger 0.83 1.166 0.233 0.56 - OO 0.508 ■ 1.000 yes
Can, UK 0.88 1.352 0.233 0.75 - OO 0.635 ■ 1.000 yes
Can,Nor 0.67 0.793 0.234 0.19 •- OO 0.188 ■ 1.000 yes
Can,Swe 0.79 1.050 0.234 0.45 •- OO 0.422 •■ 1.000 yes
Fra,Jap 0.95 1.805 0.239 1.19 •- OO 0.831 ■ 1.000 yes
Fra, US 0.90 1.441 0.263 0.76 - OO 0.641 ■ 1.000 yes
Fra,Ger 0.87 1.308 0.240 0.69 •- OO 0.598 ■ 1.000 yes
Fra,UK 0.93 1.632 0.240 1.01 •- OO 0.766 ■ 1.000 yes
Fra,Nor 0.80 1.076 0.240 0.46 ■- OO 0.430 • 1.000 yes
Fra,Swe 0.84 1.197 0.240 0.58 OO 0.523 ■ 1.000 yes
Jap, US 0.89 1.391 0.264 0.71 ■ OO 0.611 •■ 1.000 yes
Jap,Ger 0.86 1.270 0.233 0.67 OO 0.585 ■ 1.000 yes
Jap, UK 0.93 1.633 0.233 1.03 ■ OO 0.774 ■ 1.000 yes
Jap, Nor 0.80 1.077 0.234 0.47 ■- OO 0.438 • 1.000 yes
Jap,Swe 0.81 1.105 0.234 0.50 ■- OO 0.462 -■ 1.000 yes
US,Ger 0.85 1.227 0.264 0.55 ■- OO 0.501 ■• 1.000 yes
US, UK 0.95 1.799 0.263 1.12 ■- OO 0.808 1.000 yes
US, Nor 0.67 0.788 0.265 0.10 ■• OO 0.100 ■ 1.000 yes
US,Swe 0.82 1.129 0.264 0.45 •- OO 0.422 ■ 1.000 yes
Ger,UK 0.90 1.448 0.233 0.85 ■ 0.691 - 1.000 yes
Ger,Nor 0.74 0.933 0.217 0.37 ■ OO 0.354 •■ 1.000 yes
Ger,Swe 0.84 1.202 0.216 0.64 ■ OO 0.565 1.000 yes
UK,Nor 0.70 0.848 0.234 0.24 ■ OO 0.236 ■ 1.000 yes
UK,Swe 0.83 1.166 0.233 0.56 ■■ OO 0.508 • 1.000 yes
Nor,Swe 0.74 0.935 0.207 0.40 ■- OO 0.380 - 1.000 yes
a Source: Krueger and Summers (1987, p.26, Table 2.3). 
b See Hotelling (1953, §9, p.217-221) . 
c See note c to Table A.II.
d 1-tailed tests of the null hypothesis H0: p=0, against the
alternative hypothesis Hj: p>0. The relevant claim is, in fact, 
that the international wage structure is stable across countries. 





























































































Estimated Wage Equations in a Sample Selection Model
In this appendix I report the results for the estimated wage 
equations which were used to derive the industry wage 
differentials presented in section 5.
Table B.I gives the estimates of the probit overtime work 
equation used in our sample selection model. The probability that 
employees work overtime hours is estimated with the ML method as 
a function of a number of variables which explain individual 
overtime work. As far as the significance of each variable is 
concerned, we note that a relevant role is played by the number 
of children in the household, the nationality, the skill level, 
and the firm size.
In Table B.II I present the results for the regression of 
log hourly earnings on both industry variables and a set of 
controls for labour quality, demographic and working conditions 
in a sample selection model. The estimated industry wage 
differentials reported in this table were used to calculate the 
normalized industry differentials appearing in column II of Table 
IV. With respect to the raw estimates of Table B.III, we notice 
that the industry affiliation effects tend to decrease after 
controlling for human capital and working conditions. However, 
estimated industry differentials remain statistically significant 
both jointly and individually in most cases.
As far as other control variables are concerned, I defined 
several sets of dummy variables. Since the wage regression 
includes a constant, I omitted a dummy variable from each set and 
treated it as having a zero effect on wages. The reference groups 
for each set of dummy variables are the following: employees who 
did not receive any education or training at all for the 
education and training variables; unskilled blue-collar workers 
for the skill variables; single employees for the marital status 
variables; German nationality employees for the nationality 
variables; employees in firms with fewer than 20 employees for 





























































































Estimated PROBIT overtime work equation in a sample selection 
model with controls for human capital and working conditions, 






































































































































































TABLE B .I (Continued)
Parameter Mean of Number of
Variables estimate variable cases
Dummy for missing -.796 .002 7
nationality (-1.33)
Number of children under 16 .077 1.004 2, 944
(3.02)
Dummy for second house -.010
(-.06)
.025 73
Dummy for mortgage^ J j Q f c i f1 ̂  







Degree of satisfaction with .0009 7.533 2, 930
the current job (1-10) (.09)
Firm size variables:
20-200 employees .210 .295 869
(2.65)
200-2000 employees .136 .253 745
S ' (1.61)2000 or more employees .167 .289 850
(1.94)
Industry variables:









Stone, clay and glass -.083
(-.30)
.021 63
Iron and steel -.142
(-.60)
.133 393






Lumber, wood, paper .151 .043 126
and printing (.60)
Textile and apparel -.162
(-.60)
.029 85
































































































































































































































































Estimated wage equation in a sample selection model with controls 





































































































































































































































Number of nights in hospital -.001
(-2.08)
1.751 2, 072
Degree of satisfaction with 




























































































































Stone, clay and glass .146
(2.37)
.021 44
Iron and steel .130
(2.47)
.135 280











Textile and apparel .123
(2.09)
.030 62



















































































































































TABLE B .II (Continued)
Parameter Mean of Number of
Variables estimate variable cases
Social security .050 .005 ii
(.57)




Correlation between regression and 
selection equation disturbances (pue) .297




a Selectivity corrected estimate of the standard error of the 
regression.
F test that all the estimated slope coefficients jointly equal 
0 rejects at the 1% level. The 1% critical point is 





























































































Estimated wage equation in a sample selection model without 























Stone, clay and glass .296
(3.48)
.021 44
Iron and steel .252
(3.53)
.135 280











Textile and apparel .259
(3.20)
.030 62



































































































































Personal services .219 .014 28
(-2..36)
Entertainment .542 .018 38
<6 .22)
Health services .342 .015 31
<3 .77)
Legal and business .582 .008 16
services (5..42)
Non-profit organizations .397 .014 28
and private households (4 .25)
Local collective .328 .042 88
organizations <4 .23)
Social security .400 .005 11
(3..30)
Dummy for missing .248 .092 191
industry (3,.40)
HECKMAN' S A. .164
(-2..59)
Correlation between regression and
selection equation disturbances (pu„) .486




“ Selectivity corrected estimate of the standard error of the 
regression.
" F test that all the estimated slope coefficients jointly equal 





























































































forestry and fishery sector for industry variables.
The choice of the reference groups - the omitted dummy 
variables - is completely arbitrary and does not affect the 
statistical properties of the model as a whole. However, if we 
do not take this arbitrariness into account, the interpretation 
of the estimated coefficients and of their t-statistics may be 
very misleading. The coefficients for the control dummy 
variables, in fact, must be interpreted as the relative wage 
differentials with respect to an individual characterized by the 
combination of all the aspects associated with each of the 
reference groups. For this reason in the main text we presented 
a "normalized" measure of industry differentials, which are the 
variables of our major concern in this study. Limiting therefore 
our consideration to the statistical significance of the other 
control variables, we notice that in the wage equation a relevant 
role is played by almost all variables: age, tenure in the 
current job, education, skill level, marital status, health 
conditions measured through the number of nights spent in a 
hospital, the degree of satisfaction with the current job, firm 
size and industry affiliation. Human capital and working 
conditions as a whole are very important in explaining variations 
in individual wages. When these controls are introduced in the 
wage regression, the standard error of the regression is reduced 
by 30 percentage points and the adjusted R2 increases from 10 to 
52 percent.
We can also note that the coefficient for the Heckman's A. 
in our sample selection model is not significantly different from 
zero, indicating that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
no sample selection bias introduced with the elimination of 
employees doing overtime work.
Table B.III gives the estimates of two-digit industry wage 
differentials from the regression of log hourly earnings on 
industry variables only in a sample selection approach. These 
estimates were used to calculate the normalized industry 
differentials reported in column I of Table IV. As already 
noticed, most of the estimated coefficients are statistically 




























































































significant at the 1% level. We note that here the coefficient 
for the Heckman's A is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level, revealing a sample selection bias problem in this 
specification of the model. As already stressed, however, our 
estimates of the regression coefficients obtained with the 
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